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Enlisting the U.S. Courts in a New
Front: Dismantling the International
Business Holdings of Terrorist Groups
and
Statutory
Through
Federal
Common-Law Suits
Debra M. Strauss*

ABSTRACT

The time has come to extend the national approach that
has been used successfully to dismantle the infrastructure of
hate groups to the internationalrealm against terroristgroups.
The foundation of this approach is a private right to a cause of
action apart from any military or diplomatic efforts by the
government. In this Article, Professor Strauss analyzes case
precedents under several federal statutes-the AntiterrorismAct
of 1991, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, the Torture Victim Protection Act, the Alien Tort Claim
Act--as well as state common-law tort claims, including aiding
and abetting liability. Professor Strauss proposes an aggregate
model for lawsuits by victims against terrorist groups,
organizations, and state sponsors of international terrorism,
combining these claims and the types of damages and
defendants accessible. Professor Strauss also outlines important
tools for plaintiffs in the civil battle against terrorism by
exploring the obstacles to and avenues for enforcement of these
judgments through the rule of international law and access to
the frozen assets of terroriststates and organizations.
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I. INTRODUCTION

International terrorism has long been recognized as a serious
threat to foreign and domestic security. A recent report of the
Department of State shows minimal change from 2002 to 2003 in the
number of terrorist incidents worldwide--a decrease from 199 attacks
to 190.1 Likewise in 2003, the overall number of reported anti-U.S.
attacks remained more or less constant, with eighty-two anti-U.S.
attacks in 2003 compared with seventy-seven attacks in the previous
year. Worldwide deaths from terrorist activity decreased roughly 58
percent from 2002 (from 725 to 307), and the number of wounded was
down roughly 21 percent from 2,013 to 1,593.2 The report emphasizes
that most of the attacks in 2003 that have occurred during Operation
Iraqi Freedom do not meet the U.S. definition of international
terrorism because they were directed at combatants, who are
considered to be "American and coalition forces on duty."3 As the
numerical tally in the report is being revised and corrected, the
overall number of incidents, deaths, and casualties reported is
expected to be higher. 4 Of course, the numbers do not convey the
entire picture, because each of these individual victims of terrorism
has his or her own story of tragedy, and the effect on victims' families
and the nation as a whole is incalculable.

1.
Raphael Perl, Terrorism and National Security: Issues and Trends (July 6,
2004), at CRS-1, available at http://www.fas.org; see also Raphael Perl, The Department
of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism Report: Trends, State Sponsors, and Related
Issues (June 1, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org.
2.
Perl, Department of State's Patternsof Global Terrorism Report, supra note
1, at CRS-1; Perl, Terrorism and National Security, supra note 1, at CRS-1.
3.
Perl, Department of State's Patternsof Global Terrorism Report, supra note

1, at CRS-1.
See Perl, Department of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism Report, supra
4.
note 1, at CRS-1; Perl, Terrorism and National Security, supra note 1, at CRS-1.
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A modern trend in terrorism is toward loosely organized,
international networks of terrorists and cross-national links among
different terrorist organizations, which may involve combinations of
military training, funding, technology transfer, or political advice.
Terrorists have been able to develop their own sources of funding,
ranging from nongovernmental organizations and charities to illegal
enterprises, such as narcotics, extortion, and kidnapping. 5 The report
acknowledges that because "terrorism is a global phenomenon, a
major challenge facing policymakers is how to maximize international
cooperation and support, without unduly compromising important
U.S. national security interests.'"6
As the U.S. government proceeds on military and diplomatic
fronts in the war against terrorism, the time has come for private
citizens to enter the battle on civil grounds through lawsuits aimed at
crippling terrorist organizations at their foundation-their assets,
funding, and financial backing. These types of efforts have been
successful in the past at undermining the assets of hate groups in the
United States. 7 The national approach that has been used to
dismantle the infrastructure of hate groups can be extended to the
international realm and used against terrorist groups. The
foundation of this approach is a private right to a cause of action
rather than, or in addition to, relying upon military or diplomatic
efforts by the government. The U.S. courts, aided by Congress'
lending of statutory support, have begun to pave the way for civil
lawsuits brought by U.S. victims of terrorism against terrorist
organizations and the states that enable them. When other countries
then enforce these foreign civil judgments, the problem of terrorism is
removed from a political forum to the world of private international
law where reciprocity and consistency are in those nations' best
interests.

Perl, Terrorism and National Security, supra note 1, at CRS-8.
5.
Id. at Summ.
6.
Morris Dees of the Southern Poverty Law Center has been instrumental in
7.
initiating these lawsuits against hate groups as an alternative and supplement to the
criminal justice system. See, e.g., Donald v. United Klans of Am., No. 84-0725-AH (N.D.
Ala. Feb. 12, 1987) (awarding a $7 million verdict to the mother of Michael Donald,
killed because he was black). In 1998 a South Carolina jury awarded the largest
judgment ever against a hate group-$37.8 million, later reduced by a judge to $21.5
million-against the South Carolina Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and its
state leader, Horace King, for the 1995 burning of Macedonia Baptist Church.
Macedonia Baptist Church v. Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, No. 96-CP-14217 (S.C.C.P. July 24, 1998). In September 2000 the Center won a $6.3 million jury
verdict against the Aryan Nations and Butler, finding them grossly negligent in
selecting and supervising the guards who shot at two passersby. Keenan v. Aryan
Nations, No. CV-99-441 (D. Idaho Sept. 12, 2000). The judgment forced Butler to give
up the twenty-acre compound that had served for decades as the home of the nation's
most violent white supremacists. As a result of this effective use of the civil tort
system, several of these hate groups have been largely eviscerated.
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As a primer in aid of this approach, Section II of this Article will
assemble and analyze case precedents that have developed under
several federal statutes as well as common-law tort claims. In Section
III, this Article will address obstacles to collecting upon these
judgments-obstacles that include the executive branch at timesand present possible avenues for enforcement. Section IV concludes
that, in view of these case precedents, the wisest approach is to
construct an aggregate model, using a combination of these federal
statutory and common-law causes of action. In tandem, the broadest
array of defendants can be held civilly accountable, including
terrorist groups, officials, and other individuals, along with the
foreign states, organizations, and agencies that sponsor them.
Despite difficulties in enforcement, pursuing these judgments against
terrorist organizations and states is profoundly important and has
significant implications for the international business community.

II. AN ANALYSIS OF CASE PRECEDENTS

In the developing area of civil action against terrorism, lawsuits
have been brought under a broad range of federal statutory and state
common-law claims. This Article will first survey cases brought under
the Antiterrorism Act of 1991 (ATA). It will next consider the most
promising avenue of late: numerous precedents under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a
federal statute that amended the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
to help sever international terrorists from their sources of financial
and material support. This Article will also discuss cases brought
under other federal statutes, such as the Torture Victim Protection
Act and the Alien Tort Claim Act. Lawsuits have been based as well
on common-law tort claims-negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, battery, assault, aiding and abetting, conspiracy,
wrongful death, survival, false imprisonment, and the like-as such
claims have not been precluded by the addition of federal statutory
causes of action. In addition to compensatory damages for the victims,
the availability and ramifications of obtaining punitive damages
against terrorist organizations will be examined. The discussion will
include the most recent cases arising from the tragic events of 9/11,
cases founded upon a combination of these claims against terrorist
groups through the institutions that fund and enable them.
A. AntiterrorismAct of 1991

The ATA, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, provides that
[a]ny national of the United States injured in his or her person,
property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or
his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any
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appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover
threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit,
8
including attorney's fees.

Provisions are made regarding acts of terrorism that transcend
national boundaries. 9 Under § 2331(1) of the ATA, the term
"international terrorism" is defined as activities that
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or
that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction
of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended-(i) to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C)
occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they
are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or
coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek
asylum. 10

Further, any U.S. citizen or national who knowing or having
reasonable cause to know that a country is designated as a country
supporting international terrorism engages in a financial transaction
with the government of that country has committed a crime. 11 It is
also stated that providing material support or resources to terrorists
is a crime, 12 as is providing material support or resources to a
designated foreign terrorist organization. 13 The ATA allows
nationwide service of process, broadens plaintiffs' choice of venue, and
eases plaintiffs' burden of proof by providing that criminal convictions
"shall estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of
the criminal offense. ' 14 The legislative history indicates that the
enactment of the ATA was intended to "remove the jurisdictional
hurdles in the courts confronting victims and [to] empower victims
with all the weapons available in civil litigation."'15
Despite the enabling language of the ATA, its use by victims of
terrorism has been infrequent, perhaps because of its inherent
limitations. A 1992 amendment to the ATA bars any actions under its
provisions against a foreign state, an agency of a foreign state, an
officer or employee of a foreign state or of an agency thereof acting
16
within his or her official capacity or under color of legal authority.

8.
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (1991).
9.
18 U.S.C. § 2332(b).
10.
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (1991).
11.
18 U.S.C. § 2332d(a).
12.
18 U.S.C. § 2339(a) (1991).
13.
18 U.S.C. § 2339(b).
14.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2333-34.
15.
137 CONG. REC. S4511 (1991).
16.
18 U.S.C. § 2337 (1992). Congress reenacted these sections as part of the
Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 103-428, § 1003(a)(1)-(5), 106
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Note, however, that foreign governments that are state sponsors of
terrorism may now be sued under the AEDPA, discussed below. The
ATA also excludes suits resulting from "an act of war," which may
present problems in Iraq and the ensuing "war on terrorism." In
addition, it allows the U.S. Attorney General to seek to stay any civil
action based on a pending criminal prosecution or national security,
to deny access to government files, and even to stay discovery. 17 In
light of the limited cases that have applied the ATA, the potential
8
scope of this statute has not fully been determined.'
1. The Seminal Case: Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute
In the seminal case under the ATA, Boim v. Quranic Literacy
Institute and Holy Land Foundationfor Relief and Development,' 9 the
parents of a young U.S. citizen, seventeen-year-old David Boim, who
was murdered in Israel by Hamas terrorists while waiting with other
students at a bus stop, sued several individuals and organizations for
the loss of their son. They asserted that the organizational
defendants aided, abetted, and financed the individual defendants
who committed this terrorist act and that these defendants provided
"material support" or "resources" to Hamas, as those terms are
defined in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339(A) and 2339(B). 20 The parents sought
$100 million in compensatory damages and $100 million in punitive
damages, plus costs and attorney's fees, and requested treble
damages under the statute. 2 1 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the District Court, which denied defendants'
22
motion to dismiss as premature.
In this case of first impression, the appeals court decided that
funding a foreign terrorist organization is not in itself sufficient to
constitute an act of terrorism under 18 U.S.C. § 2331. Funding,

Stat. 4521, 4521-24, which was amended on October 31, 1994, to Pub. L. No. 103-429,
§ 2(1), 108 Stat. 4377 (1994). The legislative history of the 1992 amendment indicates
that it was intended merely to clarify that ordinary principles of sovereign immunity,
as codified by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602, would apply to
foreign states and their instrumentalities.
17.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2336(b)-(c) (1992).
18.
See generally Jason Binimow, Annotation, Validity, Construction and
Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2333(a), Which Allows U.S. Nationals Who Have Been
Injured "by Reason of Act of International Terrorism" to Sue Therefor and Recover
Treble Damages, 195 A.L.R. FED. 217 (2004); 45 AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 81

(2004) (citing Ungar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 211 F. Supp. 2d 91 (D.D.C. 2002),
which held that "sponsorship of a terrorist group which causes the personal injury or
death of a United States national alone is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction under
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act").
19.
291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002), aff'g 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
20.
Id.; see supra notes 12-13.
Boim, 291 F.3d at 1001.
21.
22.
Id. at 1028.
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however, that meets the definition of "aiding and abetting an act of
terrorism" does create liability under §§ 2331 and 2333.23 "Because
Congress intended to impose criminal liability for funding violent
terrorism ... it also intended through [18 U.S.C.] §§ 2333 and 2331(1)
to impose civil liability for funding at least as broad a class of violent
terrorist acts. '24 If the plaintiffs could show that defendants violated
the criminal counterparts of either 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339(A) or 2339(B),
"that conduct would certainly be sufficient to meet the definition of
'international terrorism' under §§ 2333 and 2331. ''25 The court
under §
determined that such acts would give rise to civil liability
26
2333, "so long as knowledge and intent are also shown."
The court concluded that the term "international terrorism"
encompasses the funding of terrorist activities because Congress, in
enacting the statute, intended "to allow a plaintiff to recover from
anyone along the causal chain of terrorism. '2 7 It is not funding by
itself that constitutes international terrorism, the court explained,
but funding provided with knowledge of and intent to further violent
acts, which must be a reasonably foreseeable result of the funding.
Moreover, civil liability for funding a foreign terrorist organization
does not offend the First Amendment as long as the plaintiffs are able
to prove that the defendants knew about the organization's illegal
activity, desired to help that activity succeed, and engaged in some
act of helping.
To determine the meaning and scope of §§ 2331 and 2333, the
court in Boim noted that the legislative history of the ATA is "replete
with references to the then-recent decision" in Klinghoffer v. S.N.C.
Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro In
Amministrazione.28 Leon Klinghoffer was a U.S. citizen murdered in
a terrorist attack on a cruise ship in the Mediterranean Sea. 29 The
District Court in that case found that his survivors' claims were
cognizable in federal court under federal admiralty jurisdiction and
the Death on the High Seas Act because the tort occurred in
31
navigable waters. 30 As stated in the Congressional Record,

23.
Id.
24.
Id. at 1015.
25.
Id.
26.
Id.
Burnett v. A] Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 106 (D.D.C.
27.
2003) (quoting Boim, 291 F.3d at 1011).
28.
Boim, 291 F.3d at 1010-11 (citing Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739
F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), vacated by 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991)); see Antiterrorism
Act of 1990, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practiceof Comm. on
the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 1, 12, 79, 83, 122, 133 (1990) [hereinafter Senate Hearing];
137 CONG. REC. S4511-04 (Apr. 16, 1991); 136 CONG. REC. S4568-01 (1990).

29.
30.
31.

Klinghoffer, 739 F. Supp. at 856.
Boim, 291 F.3d at 1010 (citing Klinghoffer, 739 F. Supp. at 858-59).
137 CONG. REC. E1583 (May 2, 1991).
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[o]nly by virtue of the fact that the [Klinghoffer] attack violated certain
Admiralty laws and the organization involved-the Palestinian
Liberation Organization-had assets and carried on activities in New
York, was the court able to establish jurisdiction over the case. A
similar attack occurring on an airplane or in some other locale might
not have been subject to civil action in the U.S. In order to facilitate
civil actions against such terrorists the Committee [on the Judiciary]
32
recommends (this bill].

The Boim court concluded that "the repeated favorable references to
Klinghoffer indicate a desire on the part of Congress to extend this
'33
liability to land-based terrorism that occurred in a foreign country.
2. A Modern View of "International Terrorism": Estates of Ungar v.
The PalestinianAuthority
In another prominent case brought primarily under the ATA,
Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Authority,34 a
husband and wife living in Israel were shot and killed by members of
the terrorist group Hamas while driving home from a wedding with
their infant child, who survived the attack. The couple's estate was
able to bring the suit on behalf of their two surviving children
because, as a U.S. citizen, the husband met the requirements of the
ATA (the claims on behalf of the wife were subsequently dismissed
because she was an Israeli citizen). 35 The plaintiffs alleged that the
Palestinian Authority (PA) and Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO) "repeatedly praised Hamas and its operatives, who engaged in
terrorist activities and violent acts against Jewish civilians and
Israeli targets. '36 The plaintiffs also alleged that the PA and PLO
defendants "praised, advocated, encouraged, solicited, and incited"
these terrorist activities. 37 In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that
Yaron and Efrat Ungar were killed by these acts of international
terrorism and that the individually named defendants aided and
abetted such acts. 38 The District Court in Rhode Island maintained
jurisdiction over the defendants PA and PLO because neither was
entitled to sovereign immunity in the tort action. Neither the PA nor
the PLO satisfied the criteria for statehood, since the United States

32.
Boim, 291 F.3d at 1011 (citing 137 CONG. REC. S4511-04 (statement of
Senator Grassley) (stating that § 2333 would "codify [the Klinghoffer] ruling and make
the right of American victims definitive")); see Senate Hearing, supra note 28, at 12
(statement of Alan Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State, "This
bill.., expands the Klinghoffer opinion."); H.R. REP. No. 102-1040, at 5 (1992); 136
CONG. REC. S4568-01.
33.
Boim, 291 F.3d at 1010.
34.
315 F. Supp. 2d 164, 169 (D.R.I. 2004).
35.
Id. at 167.
36.
Id. at 169.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.

688

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 38.:679

did not recognize Palestine, the PA, or the PLO as a state. The PLO
and PA did not sufficiently control Palestine, and they could not
39
conduct foreign relations.
Similar to the Boim court, the Ungar court along the way
rejected the PA's argument that "the alleged facilitation, condonation,
and failure to prevent terrorist activities in general, does not amount
to acts of 'international terrorism' as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2331, and
is therefore not actionable under 18 U.S.C. § 2333. '' 40 The court
concluded that because the plaintiffs had alleged violent acts which
would constitute crimes if committed within the jurisdiction of the
United States, their allegations satisfied the definition of terrorism
under § 2331.41 It is interesting to note that in the Ungar case,
despite numerous motions to dismiss predicated on the claim of
sovereign immunity, the defendants failed to answer the amended
42
complaint, and the court entered a default judgment against them.
As the court commented, "These Defendants have chosen not to
challenge the merits of Plaintiffs' case and decided instead to place all
of their eggs in one basket: this present motion. Unfortunately for
Defendants ... that basket is porous. '43 Ultimately, the court entered
a default judgment against Hamas for more than $116 million plus
was
attorney's fees and court costs; 44 roughly the same amount
45
each.
PLO
the
and
Authority
Palestinian
the
awarded against
3. No Sovereignty for the PLO: Knox
Organization

v. Palestine Liberation
46

In a recent decision, Knox v. Palestine Liberation Organization,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York noted, in adjudicating the plaintiffs similar ATA claim against
the PA and PLO, that it would not give its views on the broader
political questions forming the backdrop of the lawsuit; rather, it
stated that it would only determine whether and to what extent the
plaintiffs could recover in tort for the acts of violence committed
against them. The plaintiffs were representatives, heirs, and

39.
Id. at 180.
40.
Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth.,153 F. Supp. 2d 76,
97 (D.R.I. 2001).
Id.
41.
42.
315 F. Supp. 2d at 171.
43.
Id. at 176.
Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 304 F. Supp. 2d
44.
232 (D.R.I. 2004).
45.
Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12823 (D.R.I. July 12, 2004).
46.
306 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille
Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 47-49 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the PLO was not a "foreign state"
and therefore not entitled to sovereign immunity under the FSIA).
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survivors of the Estate of Aharon Ellis; Ellis, a 31-year-old U.S.
citizen, was performing as a singer before approximately 180
relatives and guests celebrating the Bat Mitzvah of twelve-year-old
Nina Kardoshova at the David's Palace banquet hall in Hadera,
Israel in January 2002 when a shooter barged into the premises and
opened fire into the crowd of celebrants, killing six people and
wounding more than thirty. 4 7 The plaintiffs sought damages from
defendants, claiming that Hassana and the other individually named
and unnamed defendants were "employees, agents, andlor coconspirators of the PLO and PA and, as such, planned and carried out
the attack acting in concert with, or under instructions or
inducements or with the assistance or material support and resources
provided by, the PLO, the PA, Yasser Arafat, and the other individual
'48
defendants.
The defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 49 The court denied the motion, holding that the
defendants were not entitled to immunity under 18 U.S.C.S. § 2337 or
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C.S. § 1602 et
seq., because they failed to establish that Palestine was a state: the
PLO and PA did not sufficiently control Palestine-given that their
authority was subordinate to Israel's sovereign control under the Oslo
Accords-and they were expressly prohibited from conducting foreign
relations under the Interim Agreement. 50 Further, the defendants
were not entitled to immunity because Palestine was not a foreign
entity politically recognized by the United States; there was nothing
in the ATA or the FSIA suggesting that Congress intended to disturb
the traditional rules of comity, and the court construed the executive
branch's silence following other cases as manifesting a view that the
PLO and PA were not entitled to sovereign immunity. 5 1 In
interpreting the 1992 amendment to the ATA that provided for
sovereign immunity, the court concluded that the relevant sections of
the ATA and FSIA function in tandem to provide a foreign state with
52
a single statutory defense to actions brought under the ATA.

47.
Knox, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 426.
48.
Id. at 426-27.
49.
Id. at 426.
50.
Id. at 445-46.
51.
Id. at 447-48.
52.
Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 315 F. Supp. 2d
164, 174 (citing Knox, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 431, which makes it clear that the sovereign
immunity inquiries under the ATA and FSIA are identical).
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4. A Limitation on Personal Jurisdiction: Biton v. PalestinianInterim
Self-Government Authority
In an interesting twist, the District Court for the District of
53
Columbia in Biton v. PalestinianInterim Self-Government Authority
found that it could not exercise jurisdiction over the five individual
defendants, including Yasser Arafat and other individuals alleged to
have bombed a school bus in the Gaza Strip, which killed the
plaintiffs husband, because they had no personal connection with the
United States. In rejecting the plaintiffs' request to adopt "a due
process analysis specifically fitted to the unique circumstances of civil
actions against foreign terrorists and their sponsors," which had been
applied by a judge on that court as well as a judge in the Eastern
District of New York in cases involving the AEDPA, the court held
that "the differences between the ATA and the FSIA are too great for
their common focus on antiterrorism to allow cross-pollination on this
issue. '54 Under the AEDPA, the court in Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic
of Iran had concluded that "a foreign state that causes the death of a
United States national through an act of state-sponsored terrorism
has the requisite 'minimum contacts' with the United States so as not
to offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'55
Similarly, in Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Judge Platt stated that "the relevant inquiry with respect to the
minimum contacts analysis is whether the effects of a foreign state's
actions upon the United States are sufficient to provide 'fair warning'
such that the foreign state may be subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States." 56 In finding that Libya could stand trial
for the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in Lockerbie, Scotland,
Judge Platt held that
[a]ny foreign state would know that the United States has substantial
interests in protecting its flag carriers and its nationals from terrorist
activities and should reasonably expect that if these interests were
harmed, it would be subject to a variety of potential responses,
57
including civil actions in United States courts.

In contrast, the court in Biton declined to extend the more expansive
due process analysis set forth above in these AEDPA cases to ATA

53.
310 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D.D.C. 2004).
54.
Id. at 178.
55.
Id. at 178 (citing Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7
(D.D.C. 2000) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)); see also
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 22 (D.D.C. 1998).
56.
Biton, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 178 (citing Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 995 F. Supp. 325, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that Libya could stand trial
for the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland)).
57.
Id.
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claims filed against individual (non-state) defendants, noting also
that in Ungar a judge on the United States District Court for the
District of Rhode Island considered this same issue and dismissed
ATA claims against individual officers of various PA and PLO law
enforcement and intelligence agencies under a traditional "minimum
contacts" analysis.5 8 Like Ungar, the Biton court did, however,
maintain jurisdiction over the U.S. widow's action against the PA and
the PLO under the ATA. 59 In denying the remainder of the motion to
dismiss, the court held "that Palestine is not a 'state' for purposes of
the FSIA based on the current record, that plaintiff had properly
stated a claim under the ATA, that supplemental jurisdiction existed
and that this case did not present
over the Biton family's tort claims, 60
a non-justiciable political question.
5. Defining the Scope of Coverage and Damages: Smith v. Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan
The court in Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,61 a
Southern District of New York case brought in part under the ATA,
took considerable care to clarify and define aspects of § 2333 further.
Plaintiff estates and survivors of two victims of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Center sued defendants Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan, the Taliban, al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and later
added Saddam Hussein and the Republic of Iraq as defendants. 62 The
claims were brought pursuant to the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, 18
U.S.C.S. § 2333, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28
against the
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). 63 A default judgment was entered
64
defendants, and the plaintiffs were awarded damages.
Plaintiffs proceeded against the non-sovereign defendantsOsama bin Laden, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan-under traditional tort principles and pursuant to the
ATA.6 5 As an initial matter, Judge Baer grappled with the statute's
definition of "international terrorism" and whether the events of
September 11 fell within this definition:

Id. (citing Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 153 F.
58.
Supp. 2d 76, 95 (D.R.I. 2001) (dismissing claims against individual PA defendants for
lack of personal jurisdiction because of the failure to show that the individual
defendants engaged in the kind of systematic and continuous activity necessary to
support the exercise of general personal jurisdiction)).
Id. at 185.
59.
60.
Id.
61.
262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id. at 220.
62.
Id. at 220-21.
63.
Id. at 240-41.
64.
Id. at 220.
65.
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Specifically, the statute defines "international terrorism" in
contradistinction to "domestic terrorism." The main difference is that
domestic terrorism involves acts that "occur primarily within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States," while international
terrorism involves acts that "occur primarily outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, or transcends national boundaries in
terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they
appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their
However, acts of international
perpetrators operate or seek asylum ....
terrorism also encompass acts that "transcend national boundaries in
terms of the means by which they are accomplished ... or the locale in
66
which their perpetrators operate."

The court held that even though the acts of September 11, 2001
clearly occurred entirely in the United States, they were acts of
international terrorism since they were carried out by foreign
nationals who apparently received orders, funding, and some training
from foreign sources. 67 Therefore, the court concluded, these facts fell
within the statute's definition of "international terrorism," and the
plaintiffs had a valid cause of action against the al Qaeda
68
defendants.
Concerning Iraq or Saddam Hussein, however, the court held
that the ATA prevents suits under § 2333 against foreign states and
officers wherein a prevailing plaintiff would be entitled to treble
damages. 69 Section 2337 explicitly provides that "no action shall be
maintained under section 2333 of this title against ... a foreign state,
an agency of a foreign state, or an officer or employee of a foreign
state or an agency thereof acting within his or her official capacity or
under color of legal authority. '70 Thus, the plaintiffs could not rely
upon § 2333 against Iraq or Saddam Hussein. These are precisely the
71
type of claims, however, that AEDPA was designed to allow.

66.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 240.
67.
68.
Id.
Id. at 225-26.
69.
70.
Id. at 226 (quoting Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222,
231 n.2 (D.D.C. 2002)).
Cronin, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 231 ('The Flatow Amendment does provide
71.
victims of state-sponsored acts of terrorism with a cause of action against the culpable
foreign state."); Surette v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 231 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D.D.C. 2002)
(allowing, without discussion, a case against Iran under § 1605(a)(7)), amended by 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21204 (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 2002); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F.
Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2001) (allowing suit against Iraq based on the statute's withdrawal
of sovereign immunity for sponsorship of terrorism); Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 106 (D.D.C. 2000) (concluding that the Flatow Amendment creates
a cause of action against a foreign state); Higgins v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 99377, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22173 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2000) (allowing, with little
discussion, a case against Iran under § 1605(a)(7)); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
18 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998) (allowing suit against Iran based on the statute's
withdrawal of sovereign immunity for sponsorship of terrorism).
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Ultimately, the court dismissed the claim against Saddam
Hussein brought under the AEDPA because a U.S. President would
have had absolute immunity for conduct associated with the exercise
of his official duties. 7 2 Still, the court found that all the elements of
the Flatow Amendment (discussed below) were satisfied as to Iraq,
including that the plaintiffs had shown by evidence satisfactory to the
court that Iraq provided material support to bin Laden and al
Qaeda. 73 The court awarded economic damages, pain and suffering,
solatium damages, but not punitive damages. 74 All defendants were
jointly and severally liable. 75 The non-sovereign defendants under 18
76
U.S.C.S. § 2333 were jointly and severally liable for treble damages.
Also of particular note is that the court in this case addressed
the types of damages available under the ATA and concluded that the
provision for treble damages precludes an award of punitive damages.
The legislative history of § 2333 shows an unequivocal congressional
intent to deter acts of international terrorism and to punish those
who commit such acts against U.S. citizens. 7 7 The court held that it
would not award additional punitive damages because the treble
78
damages provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2333 already provided a penalty.
As is discussed below, the AEDPA carries no such restriction on
punitive damages, but it does not provide for treble damages.
In conclusion, the Smith case illustrates the benefits of
employing multiple federal statutory and common-law causes of
action in cases that involve multiple defendants with differing
statuses, such as sovereign versus organizational or individual. As
will be developed more fully below, the ATA, AEDPA, and other
statutes complement each other both in terms of requisite criteria
and damages, a partnership especially critical in the post-9/11 world.
B. AEDPA Section 1605(a)(7)and the FlatowAmendment to the FSIA
Section 1605(a)(7) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) stripped foreign states and officials of
their sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA) in cases that seek money damages for
personal injury or death that was caused by torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material

Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 228.
72.
Id. at 232.
73.
Id. at 233, 239.
74.
75.
Id. at 240.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.; see also Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 304 F.
Supp. 2d 232, 239 (D.R.I. 2004) (declining to allow prejudgment interest on the same
reasoning that treble damages provided the exclusive penalty).
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support or resources (as defined in section 2339A of title 18 [of the
ATA]) for such an act if such act or provision of material support is
engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while
79
acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.

Either the claimant or the victim must have been a U.S. citizen when
the act upon which the claim is based occurred; this exception to
sovereign immunity applies to pertinent causes of action that arose
before, on, or after its date of enactment.8 0 The AEDPA authorizes
the courts to award both compensatory and punitive damages.
Moreover, it allows a foreign state's commercial property in the
United States to be attached in satisfaction of a judgment under this
provision, regardless of whether the property was involved in the
predicate act.8 1 In the 1996 Flatow Amendment, Congress also
created a federal cause of action against state supporters of terrorism
and authorized recovery for, among other things, "pain, and suffering,
and punitive damages. ''82 Taken together, these provisions of the
AEDPA have become the most frequently invoked litigation weapon
against defendants tied to terrorist activity.
Like the ATA, the AEPDA has its limitations. It permits suits
only against foreign states that were designated "state sponsors of
terrorism" before or as a result of the statute. 83 To date, seven
countries, not including Afghanistan, have been designated: Cuba,
Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.8 4 Thus, in an odd
combination of law and politics, the individual's private right to a
cause of action depends at the outset on the U.S. government's

79.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1996). See generally Michael A. Rosenhouse,
Annotation, State Sponsored Terrorism Exception to Immunity of Foreign State and
Their Property Under ForeignSovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(A),
176 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (2002) (collecting and discussing federal cases in which the courts
have considered the scope of the exception to foreign immunity embodied in this
amendment, which makes an exception, for state-sponsored terrorism, to foreign
immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
80.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(B)(ii) (1996); 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note (1996).
81.
28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(2) (1996).
82.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) note (1996). The statute gives U.S. nationals and
their legal representatives a cause of action for acts of a foreign state over which the
U.S. courts have jurisdiction under the AEDPA.
83.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A). The foreign state must have been designated as a
state sponsor of terrorism "under section 6() of the Export Administration Act of 1979
(50 U.S.C. App. 24050)) or section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2371) at the time the act occurred, unless later so designated as a result of such
act or the act is related to Case Number 1:00CV03110(EGS) in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A). See generally
Jason Binimow & Amy Bunk, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of
'Foreign Terrorist Organization' Provision of Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189, 178 A.L.R. Fed. 535 (2002) (collecting and
discussing cases decided under the foreign terrorist organization provision of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 1189).
84.
See 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(a) (2001).
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8 5
decision whether to designate a state as a sponsor of terrorism. The
AEDPA also limits suits for acts that "occurred in the foreign state"
by requiring that plaintiffs offer to arbitrate their claims "in
'
accordance with accepted international rules. 86
Most of these cases have resulted in default judgments, with
issues raised sua sponte by thorough courts, and therefore many
aspects of the AEDPA remain untested. Under the FSIA, of which the
AEDPA is a part, a court cannot enter a default judgment against a
foreign state "unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to
relief by evidence satisfactory to the court"8 7 and, consequently, these
courts have diligently conducted some sort of evidentiary hearing or
bench trial. This Article highlights several of the key cases
interpreting and employing these provisions of the AEDPA.

1. A Door Opens for Victims: Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran and
Its Progeny
The leading case under the AEPDA, Flatow v. Islamic Republic
of Iran,8 8 which set the standards and procedures for suits brought
pursuant to this statute, itself resulted from a default judgment
against Iran. The case arose on April 9, 1995, from the tragic murder
of Alisa Flatow, a twenty-year-old college student from New Jersey
who was spending a semester abroad in Israel when a suicide bomber
drove a van loaded with explosives into a bus passing through the
Gaza Strip, killing her and seven Israeli soldiers.8 9 A terrorist group,
the Shaqaqi faction of Palestine Islamic Jihad, which the court found
to be funded by the government of Iran, claimed responsibility.9" On

85.
See generally Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Note, A Critique of the Terrorism
Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 887
(2002) (criticizing the terrorism exception in light of the major changes that the 9/11
attacks produced in the international political landscape by arguing that, since the
U.S. may have to reach out to countries that are currently designated as state sponsors
of terrorism in order to combat this threat effectively, placing the foreign policy power
in the courts through this exception is counterproductive and risks disrupting fragile
alliances).
86.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(B). Despite this language, however, it is widely
viewed that in practice, arbitration of these claims by the foreign states is unlikely to
occur.
28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (2005).
87.
88.
999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998). Flatow was superseded by statute, as stated

in Hegna v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14039 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11,
2003). For a discussion of this case and others, including efforts to enforce the
judgments, see Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the U.S. Relating to
International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 181 (1999); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary

Practiceof the U.S. Relating to InternationalLaw, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 117 (2000); Sean
D. Murphy, Contemporary Practiceof the U.S. Relating to InternationalLaw, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 132, 134 (2001) (discussing U.S. judgments against terrorist states).
Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 6.
89.
90.
Id. at 8.
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March 11, 1998, the Flatow family obtained a judgment from the
court against Iran for $27 million in compensatory damages and $225
million punitive damages. 9 1 Iran denied the allegations, but it did not
appear in court in this case or the others described below. 9 2 Judge
Lamberth held that
a plaintiff need not establish that the material support or resources
provided by a foreign state for a terrorist act contributed directly to the
act from which his claim arises in order to satisfy 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(7)'s statutory requirements for subject matter jurisdiction.
Sponsorship of a terrorist group which causes the personal injury or
death of a United States national alone is sufficient to invoke
93
jurisdiction.

This Article will later discuss the efforts of, the family of Alisa Flatow
94
to collect upon this judgment.
Since Flatow, many other cases decided in the D.C. Circuit have
relied on this reading of the statute. 9 5 Under the FSIA, the AEDPA,
and the Flatow Amendment, this line of cases has developed
precedent and judgments against state sponsors of terrorism, many of
whom (often Iran) failed to appear in court to contest the claims. For
example, the case of Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran9 6 arose from
a terrorist attack on February 25, 1996, in which two U.S. nationals,
Matthew Eisenfeld and Sara Rachel Duker, were killed in Israel by a

Id. at 6.
91.
92.
Id.
93.
Id. at 18.
94.
Mr. Flatow's initial attempts to collect the judgment were unsuccessful. See
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 1999); Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
74 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. 1999). Subsequently, on October 28, 2000, the Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464,
became law, affording certain victims of terrorists' acts an opportunity to recover funds
from the United States to satisfy their outstanding judgments. One month later, on
November 28, 2000, Flatow applied for such funds, electing 100 percent recovery of the
amount of compensatory damages plus post-judgment interest. See Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 2002(a)(1)(B). His application was approved,
and on January 4, 2001, the Treasury Department transferred to Flatow more than
$26 million, representing the compensatory damages award and post-judgment
interest on that portion of the judgment. As a condition of receiving funds from the
United States, Flatow was required under § 2002(a)(2)(D) to relinquish "all rights to
execute against or attach property that is ... subject to section 1610(f)(1)(A) of title 28,
United States Code." Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act §
2002(a)(2)(D). Subsequent litigation has ensued in his efforts to collect the remainder
through the attachment of assets located in the United States. See, e.g., Flatow v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 U.S. App. D.C. 275 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
95.
See, e.g., Kilburn v. Republic of Iran, 277 F. Supp. 2d 24, 31 (D.D.C. 2003);
Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222, 234 (D.D.C. 2002); Surrett v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 231 F. Supp. 2d 260, 267 (D.D.C. 2002); Mousa v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001); Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124
F. Supp. 2d 97, 107-08 (D.D.C. 2000).
96.
172 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2000).
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bomb placed on a bus by Hamas, which was funded by the
government of Iran. Pursuant to the AEDPA, on July 11, 2000, the
families of the victims obtained a judgment against Iran for $327
97
million in compensatory and punitive damages.
Similarly, in Higgins v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the widow of
U.S. marine colonel William R. Higgins, a member of the U.N.
peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, filed suit against Iran and the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard under FSIA § 1605 (a)(7) for the
kidnapping, torture, and murder of her husband by the Hezbollah
over an eighteen month period in 1987-88.98 After Iran failed to
appear, the court conducted a nonjury trial on the question of
damages and issued an award of $55,431,937 in compensatory
damages jointly against the defendants and an award of $300 million
99
in punitive damages against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard.
Another case establishing this link between terrorism and Iran,
10 0
awarded damages to the
Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
10 1
spouse of a kidnapping victim for loss of consortium and solatium.
0 2
the court held
In another case, Stern v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
that, where a terrorist bombing caused an extrajudicial killing within
the meaning of the FSIA and the Iranian government provided
material support and resources to a terrorist group to carry out the
attack, the defendants were liable to the deceased's children.
2. A Partial Ban on Punitive Damages: Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba
03
awarded $50
The court in Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba'
million in compensatory damages and $137.7 million in punitive
damages to the families of three of the four people who were killed in
1996 when Cuban aircraft shot down two "Brothers to the Rescue"
planes-unarmed Cessna planes in international airspace searching
for Cuban refugees. The fourth victim was not able to sue under the
AEDPA because he was not a U.S. citizen. As in Flatow, the
defendant did not appear in the case, but the court nonetheless
10 4
The key
labored through the factual and legal bases for liability.

97.

Id. at 8.

Higgins v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 99-377, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
98.
22173 (D.D.C. 2000).
Id. at *3. Note that "Hezbollah," "Hizbollah," and "Hizballah" are variant
99.
spellings of the same Islamic fundamentalist group.
Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27, 51-52 (D.D.C.
100.
2001).
"Loss of consortium" includes loss of society, affection, and loss or
101.
impairment of sexual relations; "solatium" refers to damages allowed for injury to the
feelings. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 280, 1248 (5th ed. 1979).
102.
Stern v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F. Supp. 2d 286, 297 (D.D.C. 2003).
Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1249 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
103.
Id. at 1253.
104.
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distinction in Alejandre is that the court concluded that punitive
damages could be assessed against the Cuban Air Force but not the
Republic of Cuba. In determining the amount of punitive damages,
Judge King considered the total assets of the Cuban Air Force, which
may have resulted in a lower judgment than had such damages been
imposed on Cuba under the same formula. 105
As litigation under the AEDPA has proliferated in recent years,
this view of punitive damages appears to be more prevalent, bolstered
in 2000 by Congress's repeal of legislation that would have permitted
punitive damages against a foreign state in cases brought under the
AEDPA. "In so doing, Congress returned the law to its pre-1998 state,
when it provided that a 'foreign state except for an agency or
instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages[]"' 106
Since then, Judge Lamberth himself has now ruled that punitive
damages cannot be awarded against a foreign state, in contrast to his
1 7
pre-2000 view expressed in Flatow. 0
3. A Cause of Action Against a Foreign State for Torture: Price v.
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Several important holdings have come out of the Price cases. The
lawsuit was brought in 1997 under § 1605 of the FSIA by two U.S.
citizens who sued Libya for torture and hostage-taking after their
arrest in March 1980 for taking photographs alleged to be
antirevolutionary propaganda; before their eventual acquittal, the
plaintiffs were incarcerated under deplorable conditions. 0 8s In Price v.
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya(Price 1),109 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia concluded that foreign states are
not "persons" under the Fifth Amendment and thus the Fifth
Amendment does not prohibit the U.S. government from subjecting
Libya to personal jurisdiction in its federal courts. This case also set a
standard for the amount of evidence required to be alleged in the
complaint: the court held that the complaint was "simply too
conclusory" in its allegations and thus the plaintiffs did not satisfy
the definition of "hostage taking" under the FSIA. 110 The court

105.
Id. at 1249.
106.
See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-386, § 2002(f)(2), 114 Stat. 1464. See generally Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 102 n.17 (D.D.C. 2000).
107.
See Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F. Supp. 2d 13, 24 n.1
(D.D.C. 2002) ("The Court's decision in Eisenfeld predated this statutory change. Thus,
while the Court did award such damages in Eisenfeld, it cannot do so in the instant
case.").
108.
Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96, 99
(D.C. Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Price II].
109.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 85.
110.
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remanded the case to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to
attempt to satisfy the statute's rigorous definition of "torture."11' 1
On remand, in Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya(PriceII1),112 the District Court denied the foreign state's
motion to dismiss the former prisoners' torture claims under the
FSIA because the 1996 amendments to the Act created a federal
cause of action for torture against foreign states. The court held that
the state-sponsored terrorism exception, § 1605(a)(7), creates a new
exception under the FSIA for any foreign nation designated by the
U.S. State Department as a sponsor of terrorism if that nation either
commits a terrorist act resulting in the death or personal injury of a
U.S. national or provides material support and resources to an
individual or entity that commits such a terrorist act. 1 13 That court
found that the Flatow Amendment provides a cause of action against
foreign states for any act that114would provide a court with jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).
4. A Clarification of the Elements: Kilburn v. The Republic of Iran
In Kilburn v. Republic of Iran,115 the court followed the Flatow
line of cases in the District of Columbia courts and clarified some key
aspects. The action arose from the kidnapping and eventual killing in
1984 of Peter Kilburn, who at the time was employed as a librarian
and instructor of library sciences at the American University of
Beirut. 116 On June 12, 2001, the plaintiff, the victim's brother, Blake,
filed his complaint "seeking recovery for the common-law torts of
wrongful death, battery, assault, false imprisonment, slave
trafficking, and intentional infliction of emotional distress."1 17 The
plaintiff alleged jurisdiction under the state-sponsored exception to
sovereign immunity, claiming that Iran and the Iranian Ministry of
Information and Security (MOIS) provided material support to
Hezbollah for their Lebanon-based activities, including the
kidnapping and torture of the victim, while Libya and the Libyan
External Security Organization (LESO) provided material support to
the Arab Revolutionary Cells for their terrorist activities, including
the purchase and extrajudicial killing of the victim. 118 The court set
forth six separate elements that the plaintiff must establish in order
for the court to exercise its jurisdiction over the defendants:

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
274 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2003) [hereinafter Price 111].
See id. at 25-32.
Id. at 31.
277 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003).
Id. at 27.

117.

Id.

118.

Id. at 32-34.
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(1) that personal injury or death resulted from an act of torture,
extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, or hostage taking;
(2) that the act was either perpetrated by the foreign state directly or
by a non-state actor which receives material support or resources from
the foreign state defendant;
(3) that the act or the provision of material support or resources is
engaged in by an agent, official or employee of the foreign state while
acting within the scope of his or her office, agency or employment;
(4) that the foreign state be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism
either at the time the incident complained of occurred or was later so
designated as a result of such act;
(5) that, if the incident complained of occurred within the foreign state
defendant's territory, plaintiff has offered the defendants a reasonable
opportunity to arbitrate the matter; and
(6) that either the plaintiff or the victim was a United States national
at the time of the incident. 1 19

The defendants Libya and LESO challenged the second and third
elements: "that they or a non-state actor receiving material support
from them perpetrated the alleged hostage taking and killing of Peter
Kilburn, and that they provided support to the terrorist groups
involved in those wrongful acts. '120 The court, however, concluded
that, under § 1605(a)(7) and the cases interpreting it, the plaintiffs
allegations of the defendants' general sponsorship of a terrorist group
that engaged in the torture, extrajudicial killing, and hostage-taking
of Peter Kilburn, resulting in his personal injuries and death, were
enough for the plaintiff to assert the court's jurisdiction. 12 1 A plaintiff
need not establish that the material support or resources provided by
a foreign state for a terrorist act contributed directly to the act from
which his claim arises. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to
dismiss by these defendants, finding as well that the plaintiff
properly relied on common-law causes of action for his substantive
claims, and that the Flatow Amendment does provide a cause of
action against foreign states. 122 In addressing the latter issue, the
court acknowledged that, while the Flatow Amendment "clearly
establishes a cause of action against an 'official, employee, or agent' of
a foreign state that commits or causes another to commit a terrorist
act," it is not as clear from the text of the Flatow Amendment that
victims of state-sponsored terrorist acts also have a cause of action
against the foreign state itself.123 After considering the legislative
history and case precedent, Judge Urbina adopted the reasoning of
Judge Lamberth in Price III and Cronin v.Islamic Republic of Iran in

119.
Id. at 32 (citing Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 16
(D.D.C. 1998) (paraphrasing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1996))).
120.
Id.
121.
Id.
122.
See id. at 35-41.
123.
Id. at 37.
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reaching the conclusion that "the Flatow Amendment does provide
victims of state-sponsored acts of terrorism with a cause of action
against the culpable foreign state.' 1 24 As Judge Lamberth noted in
Cronin, "It is inconceivable that Congress would enable plaintiffs who
obtained judgments against foreign states like Iran to recover the
damage awards from the United States if the plaintiffs did not have a
cause of action against the foreign state in the first place."'1 2 5 Last,
the Kilburn court supported the availability of punitive damages
against the security agency of a foreign sovereign, such as defendant
12 6
LESO, under the Flatow Amendment.
5. Punitive Damages for an Extrajudicial Killing: Campuzano v.
Islamic Republic of Iran
In Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran,127 the court again
supported a cause of action against Iran, the Iranian Ministry of
Information and Security, and individual Iranian officials under
§ 1605. The plaintiffs were U.S. citizens seriously injured in a triple
suicide bombing at a crowded Ben Yehuda Street pedestrian mall in
Jerusalem on September 4, 1997.128 The bombing had been carried
out by Hamas, allegedly with training and support by the
defendants. 129 Before entering a default judgment against Iran and
its agencies, the court conducted the requisite evidentiary hearing,
detailing the close relationship between Iran and Hamas. 130 Based on
these findings of fact and its conclusion that that the bombing was an
act of extrajudicial killing that caused the victims' injuries, the court
entered a default judgment against these defendants and awarded
the plaintiffs compensatory damages, consisting of pain and suffering,
loss of prospective income, medical expenses, and solatium

124.
Id. (citing Price III, 274 F. Supp. 2d 20, 25-32 (D.D.C. 2003); Cronin v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222, 230-33 (D.D.C. 2002)). But see Roeder v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 334-35 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Price II, 294 F.3d 82, 87
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (recognizing that "the amendment does not list 'foreign states' among
the parties against whom such an action may be brought").
125.
Kilburn, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 40 (citing Cronin, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 232-33).
Judge Lamberth went on to explain that, for example, the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464, created a
mechanism whereby, among other things, plaintiffs in several cases then pending
against Iran or other foreign states for state-sponsored acts of terrorism could obtain
damages awards. Cronin, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 232-33; see also Regier v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 87, 99 (D.D.C. 2003).
126.
See Kilburn, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 41-44.
127.
281 F. Supp. 2d 258 (D.D.C. 2003).
128.
Id. at 260.
129.
Id.
130.
Id. at 262; see 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (2005) (explaining when a default
judgment may be entered against a foreign state); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
999 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1998).
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damages. 131 Finally, the court awarded punitive damages of $300
million after considering that the character of the bombing was
extremely heinous, in that the bombs were filled with metal pieces
and chemicals intended to inflict the highest amount of death and
suffering. 132 "The defendants' demonstrated policy of encouraging,
supporting and directing a campaign of deadly terrorism is evidence
of the monstrous character of the bombing that inflicted maximum
pain and suffering on innocent people. Killing innocent civilians for
political ends constitutes unconscionable conduct in any civilized
133
society."'
6. A Contrasting View on Punitive Damages: Dammarell v. Islamic
Republic of Iran
The case of Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran134 arose from
the devastating events that occurred in Beirut, Lebanon on April 18,
1983, when a massive car bomb killed sixty-three persons, including
seventeen U.S. citizens, and injured more than one hundred others.
More than eighty plaintiffs-victims of the bombing and their
families-filed this case under § 1605 of the FSIA, seeking to assign
responsibility and liability for their injuries to Iran and its Ministry
of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). 1 3 5 Once again, Iran and its
agency did not appear, and for six days the court conducted an
evidentiary hearing, as required by the statute and case law, before
entering the default judgment against the defendants. 136 First, it
found that Iran and MOIS were indeed responsible for supporting,
funding, and otherwise carrying out the unconscionable attack by the
Hezbollah terrorist group. 137 Second, the court detailed the personal
accounts of the plaintiffs in this action--"stories that supply the
necessary human dimension to the stark, horrifying skeleton of the
bombing itself."' 138 Third, the court set forth its measure of relief for

131.
132.
133.

Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 272-74.
Id. at 277.

Consistent with the longstanding precedent of this court, the court applies the
multiple of three times Iran's annual expenditure on terrorism to award
punitive damages against all defendants, except for Iran, jointly and severally
in the amount of $300,000,000, to be shared equally among the eight plaintiffs
present at the bombing.
Id. at 278-79.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

281 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 2003).
Id. at 108.
Id. at 108-13.
Id.
Id. at 108, 113-91.
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the plaintiffs, a total award of $123,061,657 in compensatory
damages.139
It should be noted that the court did not include punitive
damages because it interpreted the recent developments in the law
differently from Judge Urbina in the Kilburn case. The District Court
of the D.C. Circuit appears split over the current availability of
punitive damages. Although frustrated because the circumstances
warranted punitive damages, Judge Bates disagreed with his
colleague and interpreted a recent D.C. Circuit decision, Roeder v.
Islamic Republic of Iran,140 as precluding punitive damages against
the MOIS. Section 1606 of the FSIA provides that "as to any claim for
relief with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to immunity
under § 1605 or § 1607 of this chapter, the foreign state shall be liable
in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances; but a foreign state except for an agency or
' ' 141
instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages.
Thus while the FSIA does not permit an award of punitive damages
against a foreign state, it does allow such damages against an
"agency or instrumentality" of the foreign state. 142 In another context,
the D.C. Circuit in Roeder had considered whether Iran's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs was an agent or instrumentality of Iran, or whether it
was essentially the state itself. The Roeder court held that "if the core
functions of the entity are governmental, it is considered the foreign
state itself; if commercial, the entity is an agency or instrumentality
of the foreign state. ' 143 Applying that categorical approach to
Dammarell, Judge Bates concluded that MOIS should be treated as
the foreign state itself.144 Thus, the plaintiffs could not collect
punitive damages against MOIS. 145 Note that this decision rests upon
a statement from the Court of Appeals that the Kilburn court
considered to be dicta and may, in any event, be limited to that
circuit.
Nevertheless, in support of its judgment against the terrorist
state, the court concluded that
[a]s the witnesses often recognized, no amount of monetary or other
relief can ever bring back those who were killed or restore the past
twenty years of the lives of those who have been injured and have
suffered. But as those same witnesses frequently observed, perhaps it is
only through the financial impact of damage awards in cases such as

139.
Id. at 108.
140.
333 F.3d 228, 234 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
141.
Dammarell, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 199-200, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (emphasis
in original).
142.
Id.; see Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F. Supp. 2d 13, 24 n.1
(D.D.C. 2002).
143.
Dammarell, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 200 (citing Roeder, 333 F.3d at 234-35).
144.
Id. at 201.
145.
Id. at 202.
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this that the governments (and their agents) responsible for terrorist
conduct such as the bombing of the American Embassy in Beirut will be
146
dissuaded from similar conduct in the future.

7. Providing an Independent Claim Against a Foreign State and
Broad Personal Jurisdiction: Pugh v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya
147
the
In Pugh v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
upon
to
District Court for the District of Columbia was called
in
a
case
this
statute
interpret several unresolved issues involving
arising from the midair airplane explosion alleged to have resulted
from an act of terrorism committed by officials and agents of the
government of Libya, its intelligence service (LESO), and seven
individuals, including the Libyan head of state, Muammar Qadhafi.
Following circuit precedent under Price, the court rejected the
defendants' argument that the court cannot constitutionally exercise
personal jurisdiction over the Libyan state. 148 The court in Pugh next
addressed a then-unresolved issue in the D.C. Circuit-whether the
Flatow Amendment, in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7),
actually creates a federal cause of action against a sovereign foreign
state. 149 It concluded in the affirmative: "This Court sees no reason to
depart from the decisions of its district court colleagues here and
elsewhere construing § 1605(a)(7) and the Flatow Amendment as
providing a private cause of action for American citizens against
foreign states for harm done to them by state-sponsored acts of
terrorism."'150 The court observed, however, that "the D.C. Circuit still
1 51
regard[ed] the matter to be an open question."'
As for the individual defendants, all of whom-except Qadhafiwere officials, agents, and employees of LESO and who contested
personal jurisdiction, 152 the court in Pugh adopted an expansive view

Id. at 108.
146.
290 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D.D.C. 2003).
147.
148.
Id. at 57 (citing Price II, 294 F.3d 82, 96, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that
"foreign states are not 'persons' protected by the Fifth Amendment," and "the Fifth
Amendment poses no obstacle to the decision of the United States government to
subject Libya to personal jurisdiction in the federal courts").
149.
Id.
150.
Id.
Id.; see Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 234 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
151.
2003).
152.
Jurisdiction over these individuals in their official capacities was
established under § 1605, which expressly extended personal liability to the officials,
employees, and agents who commit the terrorist acts, limited to acts committed in
service to a sovereign state. By its own terms, the FSIA limits its jurisdictional grant to
suits against foreign states and individuals acting on their behalf in an official
capacity. Therefore, the court reasoned, the Due Process Clause must presumably be
satisfied before it may exercise in personam jurisdiction to impose civil liability upon
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of the minimum contacts test under the Due Process Clause. Unlike
the Biton court, which declined to extend such a broad view to claims
brought under the ATA, 153 the Pugh court found personal jurisdiction
over the individual defendants, based upon the following reasoning:
As the plane they chose to destroy was on an international flight and
expected to stop in several nations before reaching its final destination,
the individual defendants could and should have reasonably postulated
that passengers of many nationalities would be on board, from which
they could also expect they might be haled into the courts of those
nations whose citizens would die. Given the number of passengers on
UTA Flight 772, and the international nature of the flight, it was also
altogether foreseeable that some Americans would be aboard the plane,
whose lives would be lost, and that the individual defendants would
have to answer in some fashion in American courts for the
consequences of their actions if their identities were ever discovered.
The interest of the United States in preventing and punishing
international terrorism has been a matter of worldwide common
knowledge for years. Congress has not been indifferent to providing
judicial sanctions for terrorist acts committed abroad. Beginning at
least five years before the UTA Flight 772 bombing, a succession of
federal statutes had evinced an intent to assure the criminal
prosecution of foreign individuals who committed terrorist acts
1 54
overseas against U.S. persons or property.

Asserting as the single most important consideration about whether a
defendant's "conduct and connection with the forum State are such
'155
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there,
the Pugh court thus held that it had personal jurisdiction over the
seven foreign nationals and that the U.S. owner-lessor of the airplane
could assert tort claims against them in their personal capacities.
Notably, the court could not exercise jurisdiction over the claims
brought under § 2333 of the ATA against Libya, LESO, and these
individuals in their official capacities because of the jurisdictional
limits of 18 U.S.C. § 2337(2); however, the conversion and tortious
interference claims could go forward against the individual
156
defendants in their personal capacities.

the individual defendants for their personal conduct undertaken without state
sponsorship. Pugh, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 58.
153.
See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
154.
Pugh, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 59; see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15035 (D.D.C. 1999) (denying
defendant Libya's motion to dismiss in a suit by insurers to Pan Am and Alert to
recover money spent in settling the claims paid to the families of the passengers of
Flight 103, reading § 1605 (a)(7) broadly to encompass these third-party claims for
indemnity and contribution and conferring jurisdiction of the U.S. courts over this type
of action).
155.
Pugh, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
156.
Id. at 60-61. For the epilogue to this story, see Libya Accepts Lockerbie
Blame, REUTERS, Aug. 15, 2003; Libya Signs $170M Deal for Jet Bombing, REUTERS,
Jan.9, 2004.
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8. Reining in a Private Cause of Action and Setting New Limits:
Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran and Its Progeny
Despite this long line of cases establishing a cause of action
against foreign terrorist states through § 1605, a recent ruling from
the D.C. Circuit has put this interpretation into question. In CicippioPuleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran,157 an action filed against Iran by
the family of a terrorist victim was considered to be properly
dismissed on the grounds that neither the FSIA nor the Flatow
Amendment, separately or together, created a private right of action
against a foreign government. "This holding applies also to suits
'against agencies or instrumentalities' of a foreign state, which are
included in the FSIA's definition of 'foreign state."' 158 Cicippio also
made clear that any suit against an official of a foreign state must be
brought against that official in his or her personal capacity. Joseph
Cicippio was abducted in 1986 by Hezbollah, an Islamic terrorist
organization that receives material support from Iran; he was held
hostage until 1991, confined in inhumane conditions, and frequently
beaten. 159 On August 27, 1998, the District Court entered judgment
160
against Iran for Cicippio and his wife in the amount of $30 million.
In the current action, Joseph Cicippio's children and siblings also
sued Iran for the intentional infliction of emotional distress and loss
of solatium. 161 Despite the Iranian defendants' failure to respond to
this action and the entering of a default judgment, the District Court
sua sponte dismissed the complaint, holding that the FSIA does not
confer subject matter jurisdiction to entertain these claims. 162 On
appeal, the government submitted an amicus brief with which the
163
Court of Appeals agreed.
The Court of Appeals read 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) on its face,
declining to scrutinize the legislative history of either the statute or
its amendment, and concluded that it was only jurisdictional. It held
that § 1605(a)(7)
merely abrogates the immunity of foreign states from the jurisdiction of
the courts in lawsuits for damages for certain enumerated acts of
terrorism. It does not impose liability or mention a cause of action. The

157.
353 F.3d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
158.
Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
Cicippio-Puleo,353 F.3d at 1027-28.
159.
160.
Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70 (D.D.C. 1998).
The judgment included damage awards on behalf of two other men-David Jacobsen
and Frank Reed-who were held hostage in Lebanon by the Hezbollah and their
spouses, for a total judgment against Iran for $65 million in compensatory damages.
No appeal was taken. Id.
161.
Cicippio-Puleo,353 F.3d at 1028.
162.
Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27050, at
*4 (D.D.C. June 21, 2002).
Cicippio-Puleo,353 F.3d at 1027.
163.
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statute thus confers subject matter jurisdiction on federal courts over
164
such lawsuits, but does not create a private right of action.
In contrast, the Flatow Amendment by its language specifically
imposes liability and creates a cause of action "for personal injury or
death caused by acts of that official, employee, or agent for which the
courts of the United States may maintain jurisdiction under section
1605(a)(7)."'1 65 But the court held that the liability imposed by the
provision is precisely limited to "an official, employee, or agent of a
foreign state designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. ' 166 Thus,
"insofar as the Flatow Amendment creates a private right of action
against officials, employees, and agents of foreign states, the cause of
officials in their individual,
action is limited to claims against those
' 167
as opposed to their official, capacities."
The Circuit Court concluded that the multitude of cases decided
to the contrary 168 were misguided:
We now hold that neither 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) nor the Flatow
Amendment, nor the two considered in tandem, creates a private right
of action against a foreign government. Section 1605(a)(7) merely
waives the immunity of a foreign state without creating a cause of
action against it, and the Flatow Amendment only provides a private
right of action against officials, employees, and agents of a foreign
169
state, not against the foreign state itself.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the District Court
but, believing that the plaintiffs may have been misled by the prior
favorable judgments in assuming that the Flatow Amendment
afforded a cause of action against foreign state sponsors of terrorism,
remanded the case "to allow plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their
complaint to state a cause of action under some other source of
170
law."
Since Cicippio, the district courts of that circuit have followed
the clear lead of their court of appeals. In Wyatt v. Syrian Arab

164.
Id. at 1034.
165. Id. at 1032.
Id. at 1034.
166.
Id.
167.
168 This issue was flagged in Price II, 294 F.3d 82, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2002). "Since
Price, some district court opinions in this circuit have held or assumed that the Flatow
Amendment creates a cause of action against foreign states." Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d
at 1032. See Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222, 231 (D.D.C. 2002)
(holding that the Flatow Amendment provides a cause of action against a foreign
state); see also Regier v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 87, 98-99 (D.D.C.
2003) (adopting Cronin's reasoning that there is a cause of action against foreign states
under the Flatow Amendment); Kilburn v. Republic of Iran, 277 F. Supp. 2d 24, 36-41
(D.D.C. 2003).
169.
Cicippio-Puleo,353 F.3d at 1033.
Id. at 1036.
170.
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Republic,171 the District Court considered the claims of two U.S.
nationals who, while traveling in Turkey in 1991, were kidnapped by
terrorists associated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and
held for twenty-one days until they escaped. The plaintiff Marvin
Wilson, along with his family and the family of the late Ronald
Wyatt, brought suit against the PKK pursuant to § 2331 of the ATA
for international terrorism and the FSIA § 1605(a)(7); they asserted
claims under the Flatow Amendment against the Syrian Arab
Republic, the Syrian Ministry of Defense, and individual officials for
false imprisonment, civil conspiracy and vicarious liability,
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault,
172
battery, loss of consortium and solatium, and economic damages.
Finding that the Cicippio case bore directly on this case, the court
followed "the circuit's guidance" and granted the plaintiffs an
opportunity to amend their complaint "to clarify the jurisdictional
basis for suit, the defendants and the capacity in which each
defendant is sued, the cause of action for each claim, the relief
requested for each claim, and any other matters affected by the
'173
intervening precedent.
Similarly, in Lawton v. Republic of Iraq,174 a suit brought under
§ 1605(a)(7) against the sole defendant of Iraq (which had failed to
answer), the plaintiffs did not purport to state a cause of action under
any other source of law. In light of Cicippio,the court granted leave to
175
amend the complaint in the manner described in Wyatt.
The full effect of this interpretation was indicated by Acree v.
Republic of Iraq,176 a case in which soldiers held as prisoners by Iraq
during the Gulf War and their families filed suit under the terrorism
exception to the FSIA, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1605(a)(7), against Iraq, its
intelligence service, and its President. Two weeks after the court
entered judgment for the plaintiffs upon the defendants' default, the
United States moved to intervene, in order to contest subject matter
jurisdiction, and argued that provisions of the Emergency Wartime
Supplemental Appropriations Act 177 made the terrorism exception
inapplicable to Iraq and thus stripped the District Court of its
jurisdiction. The court cited its prior holding in Cicippio-that the
terrorism exception was a jurisdictional provision that did not provide
a cause of action against a foreign state and that the Flatow

Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 304 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2004).
171.
172.
Id. at 44.
173.
Id.
174.
Lawton v. Republic of Iraq, 307 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2004).
175.
Id. at 2 (citing Wyatt, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 44 (granting leave to amend the
complaint "to clarify the jurisdictional basis for suit, the defendants and the capacity in
which each defendant is sued, the cause of action for each claim, the relief requested
for each claim, and any other matters affected by the intervening precedent")).
Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
176.
177.
Pub. L. No. 108-11, § 1503, 117 Stat. 559, 579 (2003).
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Amendment did not afford a cause of action against a foreign state
itself. 17 8 The court also rejected the plaintiffs-appellees attempt to
offer common-law torts as an alternate source of a cause of action:
[Gleneric common law cannot be the source of a federal cause of action.
The shared common law of the states may afford useful guidance as to
the rules of decision in a FSIA case where a cause of action arises from
some specific and concrete source of law . . . (assuming, arguendo, that
plaintiffs stated a cause of action under the Flatow Amendment and
then turning to generic common law to flesh out the controlling
substantive law). But there is no support for the proposition that
generic common law itself may furnish the cause of action. Rather, as in
any case, a plaintiff proceeding under the FSIA must identify a
17 9
particular cause of action arising out of a specific source of law.

Nor did the court remand the case to allow appellees to amend their
complaint to state a cause of action under another source of law, as it
had in Cicippio, because its decision in Cicippio and its order to the
parties before oral argument provided notice of this issue to the
appellees. Despite this notice, appellees offered no alternative cause
of action when asked to do so at oral argument.1 80 While recognizing
that the soldiers "endured this suffering while acting in service to
their country," the court nevertheless dismissed their suit against the
Republic of Iraq, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, and Saddam Hussein
in his official capacity as President of Iraq on the grounds that the
8
plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action.' '
By reducing § 1605 to merely a jurisdictional vehicle, the D.C.
Circuit has, to a large degree, taken the bite out of the AEDPA.18 2 In
response, the lesson learned is to include multiple causes of action
and not rely unduly upon this provision. It remains to be seen
whether this reading of § 1605 will be limited to the courts of the D.C.
Circuit or will be adopted by others, whether the Supreme Court will
eventually be called upon to resolve a split among the circuits in this
area, or whether Congress will clarify the matter through additional
legislation.

178.
Acree, 370 F.3d at 53-54.
179.
Id. at 59 (citation omitted); see Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 315 F.3d
325, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (raising but not resolving the question whether the FSIA
creates a cause of action against foreign states). But see Anderson v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2000) (awarding compensatory and punitive
damages for the common-law torts of battery, assault, false imprisonment, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium, each of which was authorized
under § 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA).
180.
Acree, 370 F.3d at 54.
181.
Id.
182.
See generally Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practiceof the United States
Relating to International Law: State Jurisdiction and Immunities: D.C. Circuit
Interpretation of Scope of FSIA "FlatowAmendment," 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 349 (2004)
(discussing recent D.C. cases interpreting the "Flatow Amendment" and whether it
supports a cause of action against foreign state sponsors of terrorism).
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C. Other Federal Statutes: Torture Victim ProtectionAct and
Alien Tort Claim Act
Other federal statutes, such as the Torture Victim Protection Act
of 1991 (TVPA) and the Alien Tort Claim Act (ATCA), provide
additional avenues of relief for victims of terrorism against their
tormentors. They typically have been brought in lawsuits in
combination with other causes of action. This is important, because
the plaintiffs suing under the AEDPA will need to find an applicable
cause of action to invoke if the AEDPA merely rescinds immunity and
does not itself provide a cause of action. Plaintiffs can pursue actions
under these additional federal statutes or under state tort common
law, which will be discussed next. Not to be overlooked, however, is
the Flatow Amendment, which does provide an explicit enforcement
mechanism for the AEDPA immunity exception for claims against
officials, employees, and agents of foreign states in their individual
capacities.
The ATCA vests the district courts with "original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 183 Traditionally
this statute was read literally to provide a cause of action for aliens
but not for U.S. citizens. As a result, it has been widely applied by
foreign plaintiffs in humanitarian actions for international human
rights violations, but underutilized in cases involving terrorism. In
recent years, however, the scope of the ATCA has expanded with the
addition of its legislative cousin, the TVPA. In enacting the latter
component, Congress intended to supply an "unambiguous" cause of
action for both aliens and U.S. citizens injured by acts of torture or
18 4
extrajudicial killing committed under color of foreign law.
The TVPA provides for a civil action for damages against "[a]n
individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of
any foreign nation[,] . . . subjects an individual to torture" or "subjects
an individual to extrajudicial killing."18 5 It explicitly requires a
plaintiff to show exhaustion of local remedies in the place where the
crime occurred, to the extent that such remedies are "adequate and
available." 18 6 It should be underscored that, under the TVPA, a cause
of action may be brought by any individual and, unlike the ATA and
AEDPA, apparently the claimant need not be a U.S. citizen. By its

183.
Alien Tort Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005).
184.
See 102 S. REP. No. 249 (1991) (explaining that the TVPA provides "an
unambiguous basis for a cause of action that has been successfully maintained under"
the ATCA).
185.
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a)(1)-(2),
106 Stat. 73 (1992), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (West 1993).
186.
Torture Victim Protection Act § 2(b).
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terms, the statute also provides a cause of action against "an
individual." The TVPA then defines "torture" as
any act, directed against an individual in the offender's custody or
physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or
suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to lawful
sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that
individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a
third person information or a confession, punishing that individual for
an act that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected
of having committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third
187
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.

The TVPA is read naturally in conjunction with § 1605(a)(7) of the
FSIA, which confers jurisdiction on the courts in part for claims of
'188
torture, incorporating by reference this definition of "torture.
Similarly, the FSIA adopts the definition of "hostage taking" that
appears in the International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages and the definition of "aircraft sabotage" in Article 1 of the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Civil Aviation.1 8 9 These statutory enactments evidence legislative
intent for accountability and provide victims of terrorism with a
forum for that accountability. Courts have pointed to these
enactments, particularly the TVPA, to support the position that
Congress intended to create a cause of action against a foreign state
under § 1605(a)(7). 190 The potential for using these statutes in concert
has only recently begun to be explored as a litigation weapon by
victims of terrorism.
For example, in Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq,191 in which four
U.S. nationals alleged that the government of Iraq arrested, detained,
and tortured them along the Iraq-Kuwait border, the court stated
that such direct attacks on persons and the described deprivation of
basic human necessities were more than enough to meet the
definition of "torture" in the TVPA and the definition of "hostage
taking" in the International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages; such attacks thus gave rise to a claim under the state-

187.
Torture Victim Protection Act § 3(b)(1); see Regier v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 87, 97 (D.D.C 2003).
188.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(e) (2005) ("For purposes of paragraph (7) of subsection (a)
- (1) the terms "torture" and "extrajudicial killing" have the meaning given those terms
in section 3 of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991.").
189.
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979,
art. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, at 4, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205, 207; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 18 U.S.C. § 31
(2005).
190.
See, e.g., Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222, 231-34
(D.D.C. 2002) (pointing to these enactments as part of the legislative history
supporting the view that the Flatow Amendment does create a cause of action against
a foreign state, despite the absence of such express direction).
191.
97 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2000).
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192
sponsored terrorism exception to foreign sovereign immunity.
Moreover, in response to Iraq's objection on constitutional grounds,
the court found that longstanding U.S. and international policy
toward state sponsors of terrorism provided those states adequate
warning that terrorist acts against U.S. nationals, no matter where
the acts occur, may subject those states to a U.S. response, including
193
suits in U.S. courts.
In Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran,9 4 the court held that
the action of a Hamas agent in detonating an explosive charge on the
Number 18 Egged bus on February 25, 1996 fell within the scope of
the TVPA. The court found that it was a "deliberated killing not
authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court affording all judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."'195 The court noted
that

there is no question that HAMAS and its agents received massive
material and technical support from the Islamic Republic of Iran. The
sophistication demonstrated in the use of a relatively small explosive
charge with such devastating effect indicated that it is unlikely that
this attack could have resulted in such loss of life without the
assistance of regular military forces, such as those of Iran. 196

Thus, the court found that the defendants not only provided the
terrorists with the technical knowledge required to carry out the
attack on the Number 18 Egged bus, but it also gave Hamas the
funding necessary to do so. 197 The court further noted that, as of the
date of the attack, Iran was a nation designated by the U.S. State
Department as providing material support for terrorism, and the
decedent was an U.S. national.1 9 8 Finally, the court noted that "it is
beyond question that if officials of the United States, acting in their
official capacities, provided material support to a terrorist group to
carry out an attack of this type, they would be civilly liable and would
have no defense of immunity."'199 The Weinstein court also held that,
although the FSIA does not permit the awarding of punitive damages
against a foreign state, it does allow such damages against an
"agency or instrumentality" of the foreign state.20 0
In Regier v. Islamic Republic of Iran,20 1 a professor and his wife,
both of whom were U.S. citizens living in Beirut, had a cause of action

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 45.
Id. at 52-54.
184 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2002).
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Regier v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2003).
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against Iran, where the professor was taken hostage and tortured by
Hezbollah in 1984. The action was brought against Iran and the
Iranian Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS) under the FSIA
§ 1605(a)(7), along with the TVPA §3(b)(1) and several common-law
claims. 20 2 The court found the evidence to be "conclusive that Frank
Regier was 'tortured' and 'taken hostage' .

.

.

, as Frank was

kidnapped and imprisoned for 65 days under deplorable and
inhumane conditions"; it also found that the evidence "le[ft] no doubt
that agents of the Islamic Republic of Iran and MOIS were
responsible for the abduction and confinement[," noting as well that
they had been found liable in a number of cases very similar to this
one. 20 3 The court agreed with the analysis and conclusions of Judge
Lamberth in Cronin (before Cicippio) and likewise held that the
plaintiffs had a cause of action against Iran. 20 4 In entering a default
judgment for compensatory damages against the defendants, the
court declined to award punitive damages. It reasoned that while the
FSIA does not permit the award of punitive damages against a
foreign state, it does allow such damages against an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state. 20 5 Because of the intervening D.C.
Circuit's ruling in Roeder, however, it held that MOIS should be
treated as a foreign state itself, rather than as an "agent," and hence
could not be liable for punitive damages under the Flatow
206
Amendment.
There are limits to the extent victims may rely upon the TVPA or
FSIA as a basis for their claims. A rare glimpse of this limit came
from the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Price II, in which the
court, after an extensive discussion of the meaning of "torture"
sufficient to abrogate immunity under the FSIA, concluded that "the
facts pleaded do not reasonably support a finding that the physical
abuse allegedly inflicted by Libya evinced the degree of cruelty
necessary to reach a level of torture. '20 7 As a result, the court
remanded the case and allowed the plaintiffs to amend the complaint
beyond mere conclusory allegations:

202.
Id. at 88-89.
Id. at 97-98; see, e.g., Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d
203.
222, 234 (D.D.C. 2002); Surette v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 231 F. Supp. 2d 260, 267
(D.D.C. 2002); Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F. Supp. 2d 27, 33 (D.D.C. 2001);
Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27, 44 (D.D.C. 2001); Anderson
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107, 113-14 (D.D.C. 2000); Cicippio v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 68 (D.D.C. 1998).
204.
Regier, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 104.
205.
Id. at 101.
206.
Id. at 99 (citing Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 234-35
(D.C. Cir. 2003)); see also Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 105
(D.D.C. 2003).
207.
294 F.3d 82, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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Plaintiffs must allege more than that they were abused. They must
demonstrate in their pleadings that Libya's conduct rose to such a level
of depravity and caused them such intense pain and suffering as to be
properly classified as torture. Although it is far from certain, their
complaint hints that they might be able to state a proper claim for
torture under the FSIA. Accordingly, we will remand the case to the
District Court to allow plaintiffs to attempt to amend their complaint in
208
an effort to satisfy TVPA's stringent definition of torture.

D. Common-Law Tort Claims
A state tort suit based on terrorist acts could, at least in theory,
also be brought in state court. A state court may, however, be
reluctant to exercise its jurisdiction over a case arising from alleged
misconduct occurring outside the United States and may therefore
20 9
dismiss the case based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Other issues such as personal jurisdiction and service of process may
also make state courts unable to provide remedies against
international terrorists.210
The focus in this Article, then, remains on maximizing the
viability of these civil claims in the federal courts. Common-law tort
claims are not precluded by these federal statutory causes of action.
Moreover, they are, increasingly, of critical importance to include in a
complaint in federal court against terrorist organizations and the
states that support them, with federal statutes as a jurisdictional
foundation. Possible common-law claims include, but are not limited
to, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, battery,
assault, wrongful death, survival, false imprisonment, loss of
consortium, and solatium. This list is not exhaustive, and each
plaintiff should explore the full range of available causes of action
that may be applicable. In addition, great potential exists to make use
of the general principles of "civil conspiracy" and "aiding and
abetting" a tort, set forth in cases such as Halberstam v. Welch, as a

Id. at 91-95.
208.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is a rule of U.S. law, which states
209.
that when a case is properly heard in more than one court, it should be heard by the
one that is most convenient and has the closer connection to the cause of action that led
to the case. For more on this doctrine, see RICHARD SCHAFFER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
BUSINEss LAW AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 87-90 (6th ed. 2005).
For instance, some states' long-arm statutes, like New York's, do not extend
210.
jurisdiction to its constitutional limits. Additional problems may include choice of law,
proving causation, establishing a cause of action for supporting as opposed to engaging
in terrorism, opposing a forum non conveniens motion, and validly serving process on
unincorporated organizations. See, e.g., Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d
44, 50 n.6, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1991); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1980) (forum
non conveniens).
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way to impose liability on the "aiders and abettors" of international
2 11
terrorism.
In Kilburn, the court specifically addressed this issue and cited
other cases establishing that a plaintiff bringing suit under
§ 1605(a)(7) may base his claim on conventional common-law torts
such as assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 212 Neither § 1605(a)(7) nor the Flatow Amendment
undermines the viability of existing federal and state common-law
claims once sovereign immunity is waived. 213 The Flatow
Amendment created a new statutory cause of action for certain
victims of international terrorism, but it did not overrule the old
common-law claims. 214 Indeed, none of the cases dealing with the
Flatow Amendment or its corresponding legislative history suggests
that Congress intended the Flatow Amendment to provide the
exclusive cause of action for acts of state-sponsored terrorism. 215 The
court concluded that "[t]he plaintiffs common-law claims must
statutory cause of action
therefore co-exist alongside the federal
2 16
granted under the Flatow Amendment.
The Kilburn court further discussed the type of common-law
claims that would be allowed. Judge Urbina noted that the D.C.
Circuit recently cautioned district courts about the use of "federal
common law" in FSIA cases. 217 Because the FSIA provides that "the
foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances," it in effect

211.
See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477, 478, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(noting for harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one
may be subject to liability; aiding-abetting focuses on whether a defendant knowingly
gave "substantial assistance" to someone who performed wrongful conduct; there is no
reason to believe tort theory cannot also be adapted to new uses); Boim v. Quaranic
Literary Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1018 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (holding that plaintiffs may
bring a cause of action under § 2333 that is based on a theory that defendants aided
and abetted international terrorism); see also Peter M. Mansfield, Terrorism and a
Civil Cause of Action: Boim, Ungar, and Joint Torts, 3 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L.
119 (2003) (outlining elements of a cause of action for aiding and abetting a tort under
sections 2333 and 1607).
Kilburn v. Republic of Iran, 277 F. Supp. 2d 24, 35-36 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing
212.
Stern v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F. Supp. 2d 286 (D.D.C. 2003); Acree v. Republic
of Iraq, 271 F. Supp. 2d 179 (D.D.C. 2003)); see also Stethem v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 201 F. Supp. 2d 78, 87 (D.D.C. 2002); Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F.
Supp. 2d 27, 33-37 (D.D.C. 2001) (Lamberth, J.); Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27, 47-50 (D.D.C. 2001); Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90
F. Supp. 2d 107, 113 (D.D.C. 2000); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d
62 (D.D.C. 1998).
213.
Kilburn, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 36.
214.
Id.
Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1996); see, e.g., Price III, 274 F. Supp. 2d 20
215.
(D.D.C. 2003) (Lamberth, J.); Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 222
(D.D.C. 2002); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998).
216.
Kilburn, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 36.
Id.
217.
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instructs the court "to find the relevant law, not to make it."'218 The
D.C. Circuit reasoned that the court could look to the common law of
the states to determine the meaning of a cause of action, one example
being a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.2 19 Judge
Urbina concluded that "the D.C. Circuit is cautioning courts not to
create new federal common-law claims for use against foreign
sovereigns while at the same time condoning the use of pre-existing
common-law claims. ' 22 0 In Kilburn, the plaintiffs complaint named
the preexisting common-law claims of wrongful death, battery,
assault, false imprisonment, slave trafficking, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, based on the D.C.
Circuit's recent reasoning, the court allowed the plaintiffs claims
22 1
against the defendants.
The court in Regier v. Islamic Republic of Iran stressed that
[e]ven if the Flatow Amendment were held not to create a federal
statutory cause of action against state sponsors of terrorism, the
Regiers would nevertheless have valid claims against Iran and MOIS
under state and/or federal common law. Courts have regularly
concluded that common law claims for, e.g., wrongful death, survival,
assault, battery, false imprisonment, and kidnapping may be asserted
222
against state sponsors of terrorism under the FSIA.

Here, the plaintiffs alleged battery, assault, false imprisonment,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, economic damages, and
loss of consortium and solatium, and the court found that the
evidence adduced at the hearing clearly supported the defendants'
22 3
liability on these claims.
Another example of the use of common-law claims in conjunction
with § 1605 of the FSIA is illustrated by Anderson v. Islamic Republic
of Iran. 224 Plaintiff Terry Anderson, a U.S. journalist working in
Beirut, Lebanon, had been held hostage by Hezbollah under execrable
conditions for nearly seven years. 225 Terry Anderson, his wife,
Madeleine Bassil (a Lebanese citizen, a fact which posed no problem
for the suit because the victim was a U.S. citizen), and his daughter,
Sulome (born while he was in captivity), sued Iran and the MOIS for

218.
Id.
219.
Id.
220.
Id.
221.
Id. (citing Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 315 F.3d 325, 333 (D.C. Cir.
2003), and quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1606).
222.
281 F. Supp. 2d 87, 100 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing Jenco v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 154 F. Supp. 2d 27, 32-33 (D.D.C. 2001); Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
151 F. Supp. 2d 27, 47-50 (D.D.C. 2001); Elahi v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F.
Supp. 2d 97, 109-13 (D.D.C. 2000); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1,
27-32 (D.D.C. 1998)).
223.
Id. at 100.
224.
90 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2000).
225.
Id. at 108-09.
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damages based on common-law torts of battery, assault, false
imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of
consortium, each of which was found by the court to be authorized
under § 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA.2 2 6 Specifically, Anderson himself was
awarded compensatory damages for battery, assault, false
imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of
consortium.2 27 His wife was compensated for emotional distress and
loss of consortium and solatium, and their daughter was compensated
for loss of solatium.2 28 The court considered punitive damages, but
determined that it could not include a punitive damages award
against Iran since the FSIA expressly exempts a foreign state from
such liability. 22 9 An "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state
may, however, be liable for punitive damages. The term "agency or
instrumentality" includes a separate legal person or entity that is "an
organ of a foreign state" or is owned by it. 23 0 Accordingly, in addition
to awarding compensatory damages in the amount of $41,240,000
against Iran and MOIS, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson awarded
punitive damages of $300,000,000 against MOIS, which he calculated
to be three times its maximum annual budget for terrorist
activities. 231 This punitive damages award against MOIS predated
the D.C. Circuit's decision in Roeder, a case in which the court found
MOIS to be indistinguishable from the Iranian state, a holding since
relied upon by the district courts to deny punitive damages against
MOIS. 23 2
A similar case, Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, arose out of
the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon on October 23,
1983. The plaintiffs were family members of the 241 deceased
servicemen and injured survivors of the attack; they sued under the
FSIA § 1605(a)(7) for wrongful death and common-law claims for3
23
battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
After the defendants failed to appear, the court conducted the
evidentiary hearing required under FSIA § 1608(e) and applied the
"clear and convincing" standard of proof.2 3 4 There were no additional
procedures or analyses specific to the common-law claims. The court
found that

Id. at 113.
226.
Id. at 114.
227.
Id. at 113.
228.
Id. at 114 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1606, and Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
229.
18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 69 (D.D.C. 1998)).
Id. at 114 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)).
230.
Id.
231.
232.
See, e.g., Regier v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 87, 102 (D.D.C.
2003) (citing Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 234-35 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
233.
264 F. Supp. 2d 46, 47-48 (D.D.C. 2003)).
Id. at 48.
234.
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[ilt
is clear that the formation and emergence of Hezbollah as a major
terrorist organization is due to the government of Iran. Hezbollah
presently receives extensive financial and military technical support
from Iran, which funds and supports terrorist activities. The primary
agency through which the Iranian government both established and
exercised operational control over Hezbollah was the Iranian Ministry
235
of Information and Security.

Concluding that the attack by the suicide bomber was an act of statesponsored terrorism, the court entered a default judgment against the
defendants, ordered that all damages claims in these actions be
submitted to Special Masters, and decided to "take under advisement
the issue of imposing an amount in punitive damages against the
defendants, pending the entry of judgment as to the amounts of
2 36
compensatory damages."
E. A Potpourriof Claims: The Recent 9/11 Case
The case of Burnett v. Al Baraka Investment and Development
Corporation,237 currently pending in the District of Columbia,
illustrates an application of the aggregate model. In Burnett, a large
civil action arising from the 9/11 World Trade Center tragedy, more
than two thousand victims and their families seek to hold accountable
the persons and entities that funded and supported the international
terrorist organization known as al Qaeda, which is now generally
believed to have carried out the attacks. 238 With the goal of ending
the funding of terrorism, the plaintiffs seek $100 trillion against
banks, charitable organizations, and companies (nearly 200 entities
or persons in all) for allegedly supporting terrorism directly or
indirectly, providing material support, and aiding and abetting or
conspiring with terrorists who perpetrated the attacks. 23 9 The
plaintiffs have brought their suit under several theories: the
statutory support of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
§ 1605(a)(7), the Antiterrorism Act § 2333, the Torture Victim
Protection Act, and the Alien Tort Claim Act-and the federal

235.
Id. at 53.
236.
Id. at 59-65.
No. 02-1616(JR) (D.D.C. filed Aug. 15, 2002). The original complaint in this
237.
action was filed on August 15, 2002, and the third amended complaint was filed in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on November 22, 2002.
238.
Since the lawsuit was filed, the number of plaintiffs has risen to more than
four thousand, and more individuals continue to join the action. See Burnett et al. v. Al
Baraka Investment et al.: A Case Overview, availableat http://www.aslaw.com/911suit/
overview%20WEB.doc (last visited Aug. 2, 2004) [hereinafter A Case Overview];
William Oliver & Anthony Sellitto, My Involvement in Burnett v. Al Baraka: How and
Why, available at http://www.aslaw.com/91lsuit/HOWANDWHY.htm (last visited Aug.
2, 2004).
239.
See Burnett, No. 02-1616 (JR)(D.D.C. filed Aug. 15, 2002); A Case Overview,
supra note 238; How and Why, supra note 238.
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common-law tort claims of wrongful death, negligence, survival,
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy,
aiding and abetting, and even the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§1962 (a) and (d).240 It should
be noted that, in addition to compensatory damages, the plaintiffs
request punitive damages against all the defendants, but for the
punitive damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1606, they request an award
241
against all defendants except the Republic of Sudan.
In a recent development, nineteen of the defendants sought
dismissal. In Burnett 1,242 the court addressed four of the motions,
dismissing some of the common-law tort claims against one of the
organizations, but upholding the complaint as stating a cause of
action on plaintiffs' federal statutory claims. Specifically, the court
denied these defendants' motions to dismiss most of the claims,
finding that the complaint stated a cause of action for the ATA,
ATCA, and common-law intentional tort claims. It did, however,
grant the motion to dismiss the negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress and RICO claims against defendant Al-Haramain
Islamic Foundation (AHIF), and it granted the motion to dismiss the
RICO claim for defendants Al Rajhi Banking and Investment and
Soliman J. Khudeira. 243 Judge Robertson set forth an interesting
discussion of the foundation for many of these claims-for instance,
laying out the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress
and noting that "[i]f the defendants' conduct is sufficiently outrageous
and intended to inflict severe emotional harm upon a person which is
not present, no essential reason of logic or policy prevents
liability. '244 He stated that the funding of terrorist activities is
actionable under the ATA, and "[1liability can be established by
proving violations of the criminal counterparts of [18 U.S.C. §§ 2333,
2339A, or 2339B], or ... by resort to traditional aiding and abetting
'24 5
theory.
In discussing the theories of conspiracy and aiding and abetting
raised, the court supported the potential application of the standards
enunciated in Halberstam v. Welch: "(1) the party whom the
defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury; (2)
the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an
overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides the

240.
Burnett, No. 02-1616 (JR).
241.
Id.
242.
See Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C.
2003) [hereinafter Burnett 1] (dismissing some of the common-law tort claims against
one of the organizations but upholding the complaint as stating a cause of action on
plaintiffs' federal statutory claims).
243.
Id. at 111.
244.
Id. at 108 (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 307 (2000)).
245.
Id. at 106-07 (citing Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found. for
Relief& Dev., 291 F.3d 1000, 1011, 1021 (7th Cir. 2002)).
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assistance; (3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist
the principal violation. '246 In addition, "a 'joint venturer's' liability
extends to all reasonably foreseeable acts done in connection with the
tortious act that the person assisted. '24 7 Judge Robertson also noted
that liability for aiding and abetting or for conspiracy must be tied to
a substantive cause of action-in defendant AHIF's case, the ATA,
the ATCA, and a number of common-law torts. 248 Given the adequacy
of the plaintiffs' allegations that the AHIF aided, abetted, and
conspired with the 9/11 hijackers, the plaintiffs had also stated
common-law claims for wrongful death, survival, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.249
Turning to the ATCA, the court noted that the question of
whether the ATCA creates a separate cause of action or merely
confers subject matter jurisdiction is the subject of wide, and current,
debate, and it remains unsettled in the D.C. Circuit. 250 But, Judge
Robertson wrote, "[t]he great majority of the federal courts outside
this Circuit that have addressed the issue have held that the ATCA
does create a cause of action[,]" and he decided to adopt that
position. 25 1 Judge Robertson then outlined the elements of a claim
thereunder: "(1) the plaintiff is an alien; (2) the claim is for a tort; and
(3) the tort is committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States. '252 Finding the first two elements easily met in
this case, the court concluded that, concerning the third element,
"aircraft hijacking is generally recognized as a violation of

Id. at 104 (citing Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
246.
247.
Id. at 105 (citing Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484).
Id.
248.
Id. at 107.
249.
250.
Id. at 99 (citing Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1146 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (Randolph, J., concurring); Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 257 F. Supp. 2d 115,
120 (D.D.C. 2003)). The Burnett I court discussed the case of Tel-Oren v.Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), affirming the dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction of an ATCA action brought against Arab and Palestinian
organizations by victims of an armed attack on a civilian bus in Israel. Burnett I, 274 F.
Supp. 2d at 99. In Tel-Oren,
Judge Edwards found that, while the ATCA created a cause of action, it would
not support an award of damages for torture committed by non-state actors;
Judge Bork thought that the ATCA did not grant a cause of action in the first
place; and Judge Robb concluded that the action presented a nonjusticiable
political question.
Id. (citing Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791, 795, 799, 823). In Burnett I, Judge Robertson
adopted the position of Judge Edwards. Id.
Burnett I, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 99 (citing Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d
251.
1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847-48 (11th Cir. 1996);
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F.
Supp. 2d 424, 443 (D.N.J. 1999); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362,
370 (E.D. La. 1997), affd, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.
Supp. 162, 179 (D. Mass. 1995); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993)).
Id. at 99-100 (citations omitted).
252.
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international law of the type that gives rise to individual liability.
Most significant, the court held that principles of accomplice liability
apply under the ATCA to those who assist others in the commission
of torts that violate customary international law: "[a]lthough no
defendant in this case is sued as a direct perpetrator of a tort
committed in violation of the law of nations, proof that they were
accomplices, aiders and abetters, or co-conspirators would support a
''254
finding of liability under the ATCA.
The court did, however, preclude the use of RICO claims for
these circumstances, concluding that "[t]he overwhelming weight of
authority discussing the RICO standing issue holds that the 'business
or property' language of §1964(c) does not encompass personal
injuries. ' 255 The court also dismissed a claim that amounted to
negligence per se (the plaintiffs had argued that the AHIF's "failure
to identify or track charitable funds being used to promote and
finance terrorist activities constitutes a breach of its duty of care and
obligations"). 25 6 The plaintiffs' failure to identify any applicable laws
and regulations, presumably governing charities, doomed this
argument. 257 Last, the court dismissed claims against the defendant
bank Al Rajhi, holding that "Itihe act of providing material support to
terrorists, or 'funneling' money through banks for terrorists is
unlawful and actionable," but finding that Al Rajhi was alleged only
to be the funnel. 258 "Plaintiffs offer no support, and we have found
none, for the proposition that a bank is liable for injuries done with
money that passes through its hands in the form of deposits,
withdrawals, check clearing services, or any other routine banking
service. ' 25 9 Moreover, although the complaint included claims against
members of the al-Rajhi family who are bank officers, it made "no
allegations that would support an inference that any al-Rajhi family
member was acting within the scope of his bank employment when he
allegedly provided support to al Qaeda, as would be necessary to

253.
Id. at 100.
254.
Id.
255.
Id. at 101.
256.
Id. at 109.
257.
Id.; see also Riggs v. Schappell, 939 F. Supp. 321, 332 n.15 (D.N.J. 1996)
("Plaintiffs argue that a duty may be imposed ... on the basis of a violation of industry
custom or practice. However, as plaintiffs have directed this court to no industry
custom or practice defendants .
are alleged to have violated, this argument must be
rejected.").
258.
Burnett I, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 109.
259.
Id.; see, e.g., Tasso v. Platinum Guild Int'l, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 252, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 1997) (dismissing claims against corporate defendant because of
plaintiffs failure to plead facts from which an inference could be drawn that the
individual defendant's actions were in furtherance of employer's business, which is part
of the scope of employment test).
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impose vicarious liability on the bank for the acts of its officers and
' '260
employees.
In a subsequent decision in the Burnett case (Burnett I1),261 a
motion to dismiss by defendants Prince Turki A1-Faisal bin Abdulaziz
Al-Saud and Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, the court
dismissed the claims against them for acts allegedly done in their
official capacities for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs'
reliance upon the "commercial activities" exception, § 1605(a)(2) of
the FSIA, and the "noncommercial tort" exception, § 1605(a)(5), was
rejected by the court because the official acts that the plaintiffs
ascribed to the Princes were squarely covered by the "discretionary
function" language. 26 2 The issue was whether the particular actions
that the foreign state performs-whatever the motive behind themare the type of actions by which a private party engages in trade and
traffic or commerce. The "act of contributing to a foundation is not
within our ordinary understanding of 'trade and traffic or commerce,'
nor, apparently, was it within the contemplation of the Congress that
enacted the FSIA in 1976":
By contrast, a foreign state's mere participation in a foreign assistance
program administered by the Agency for International Development
(AID) is an activity whose essential nature is public or governmental,
and it would not itself constitute a commercial activity ....263

One might argue that funding a terrorist group, although not
commercial, would be sponsoring terrorism. A claim, however, could
not be brought against the Princes under the "state-sponsored
terrorism" exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), because only a defendant
that has been specifically designated by the State Department as a
"state sponsor of terrorism" is subject to the loss of its sovereign
immunity. Because the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had not been
designated a "state sponsor of terrorism" by September 11, 2001, this
2 64
provision was inapplicable.
In Burnett II, the court also dismissed the claims against Prince
Sultan for acts allegedly done in his personal capacity for lack of
personal jurisdiction. 265 The court found that "Prince Sultan does not
enjoy foreign sovereign immunity from claims that arise from
contributions he allegedly made to the IIRO, the WML, the WAMY,
and Al-Haramain in his personal capacity. His motion to dismiss
260.
Burnett I, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 109 n.18.
261.
Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 292 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2003)
[hereinafter Burnett Il].
Id. at 16-20.
262.
263.
Id. at 18 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 16 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6615).
264.
Id. at 17 n.3 (citing Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 315 F.3d 325, 329
(D.C. Cir. 2003)).
265.
Id. at 21.
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those claims accordingly asserts, not lack of subject matter
jurisdiction-which is conferred by the ATA for the claims of United
States nationals and by the ATCA for the claims of foreign
nationals-but lack of personal jurisdiction. '266 The plaintiffs had not
indicated how official visits, speaking engagements, or an American
education might have been connected with their cause of action so as
to satisfy the "minimum contacts" necessary for personal jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs' principal argument, instead, was basically that Prince
Sultan "brought himself within the jurisdiction of this court, or any
American court that might entertain an ATA action against him,
when he 'purposefully directed' his allegedly tortious activities at
residents of the United States." 267 The core of the plaintiffs'
allegations against Prince Sultan in his personal capacity was that he
personally donated money to several foundations that funded
terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda, and that "anyone whose
actions have led to terrorist activity in the United States should
reasonably anticipate that he might be subject to suit here whether or
not he himself has targeted the United States."268 The court found
that the complaint did not allege that Prince Sultan's actions were
"expressly aimed" or "purposefully directed" at the United States,
which would be necessary to satisfy the standard:
The Court has consistently held that [foreseeability of causing injury in
another State] is not a "sufficient benchmark" for exercising personal
jurisdiction. Instead, "the foreseeability that is critical to due process
analysis . . . is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there." ... It is essential in each case that there be some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws." This "purposeful availment" requirement
ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a
result of "random," "fortuitous," or "attenuated" contacts, or of the
"unilateral activity of another party or third person." 26 9

Thus, unlike some of the other cases previously cited that treated
personal jurisdiction more expansively, 270 Judge Robinson applied a
more restrictive, traditional due process analysis. Finding nothing

Id.
266.
Id. at 22.
267.
Id. at 22-23.
268.
Id. at 23 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75
269.
(1985)).
For a discussion of the restrictive, traditional due process analysis applied
270.
in other ATA cases, such as Biton and Ungar, as contrasted with the more expansive
view evidenced in the AEDPA cases, see supra notes 34-45, 53-60 and accompanying
text. See, e.g., Pugh v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 290 F. Supp. 2d 54
(D.D.C. 2003); Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 290 F. Supp. 2d 54
(D.D.C. 2003); Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d (D.D.C. 2000).
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like that sort of purposeful availment to be alleged here, he dismissed
27 1
the claims against this defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction.
As the Burnett case continues to proceed against the majority of
the defendants through a vast array of claims, 27 2 new judicial
interpretations of the law in this area will undoubtedly be made,
adding to the body of cases discussed above. The Burnett case, with
its combination approach, will serve as a model to future litigants
seeking to eradicate the funding of terrorism.

III.

ENFORCEABILITY OF JUDGMENTS

Although the main focus of this Article is to present and analyze
the various causes of action that may be brought against terrorist
organizations and the individuals, officials, and states that enable
them, no discussion in this area would be complete without
addressing the practicalities of proceeding once such a judgment has
been obtained. Accordingly, this Article will now explore the obstacles
to enforcement, such as the general tendency of international courts
to disfavor punitive damages, and the political considerations that
have at times led the President or State Department to override the
release of assets to satisfy these large damage awards. In response to
the difficulties encountered by these plaintiffs in enforcing their
judgments, Congress has aided the collection efforts with legislation,
such as the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000
and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, which allow the
satisfaction of these judgments with the assets of terrorist groups
already held in abeyance in the United States, and which support
plaintiffs' efforts to locate and confiscate additional property.
A. General Principlesof InternationalLaw
One impediment to the enforcement of the judgments
terrorist organizations and the parties that support them
found in the common trends of international law. As a
matter, judgments of U.S. courts will often be enforced by

against
can be
general
foreign

271.
Burnett II, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 23.
272.
On December 9, 2003, the Multidistrict Litigation Panel centralized six
then-pending 9/11-related cases and transferred them to the District Court for the
Southern District of New York "for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings." In
his decision on a subsequent set of similar motions to dismiss by other defendants,
Judge Richard Conway Casey noted that he would apply the law of the Second Circuit
to this case, not the law of the transferee court from the D.C. Circuit. See Burnett v. Al
Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp. (In re Terrorist Attacks), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 640
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2005) (dismissing some of the claims against several of the
defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and
failure to state a claim).
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courts on the basis of reciprocity and comity in countries where the
losing party or its property can be found. Foreign courts, however,
sometimes refuse to enforce judgments of U.S. courts if they view the
amount of money awarded to be excessive, if there are punitive or
treble damages, or if they think the court extended its net of
jurisdiction too widely. 273 In general commercial matters, uniform
legislation and treaties, such as the Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments on Civil and Commercial Matters
(hereinafter, Lugano Convention), 274 have been negotiated and
adopted to facilitate uniformity and certainty in the international
business community. Even the Lugano Convention, however, which
by its terms applies only to judgments of the contracting states (not
the United States), provides for situations in which a judgment shall
not be recognized. For example, a judgment will not be recognized
when "such recognition is contrary to public policy in the State in
which recognition is sought"; "where it was given in default of
appearance, if the defendant was not duly served with the document
which instituted

the

proceedings

. .

."; or "if

the judgement

is

irreconcilable with a judgement given in a dispute between the same
parties in the State in which recognition is sought. '275 In this way,
the Lugano Convention simply codifies many of these general
principles and trends in the international forum. The important
policy implications in this context are no less compelling.
Ironically, the absence of punitive damages in some of the cases
discussed above and, on occasion, the plaintiffs' failure to obtain
treble damages by bringing certain of these defendants under the
scope of the ATA may assist efforts to enforce U.S. judgments
overseas or at least help to avoid some of the enforceability problems
generally incurred when punitive or treble damages are involved. Put
another way, the plaintiffs might not have collected upon the punitive
and treble damage awards in those foreign courts in any event. But
because the abrogation of sovereign immunity under the AEDPA does
not constitute voluntary waiver or consent to jurisdiction by these

273.
See generally SCHAFFER ET AL., supra note 209, at 96-97 (addressing the
enforcement of foreign judgments).
274.
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters Done at Lugano on 16 September 1988, 1988 O.J. (C 189),
available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lmlec.efta.jurisdiction.enforcement.judgments.civil.
commercial.matters.lugano.convention. 1998/doc (last visited Feb. 6, 2005) [hereinafter
Lugano Convention]. In Lugano, Italy, eighteen European countries adopted the
"Lugano Convention." The "Contracting States" are Belgium, Denmark, Federal
Republic of Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Portugal, Switzerland, Finland, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom. In addition to providing recognition generally for the judgments of
the contracting states without requiring any special procedures, the Lugano
Convention sets forth details for where the application should be submitted for each of
the contracting states.
275.
Id. at art. 27.
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states-indeed many of them refused to appear in the action, and the
judgment was obtained by default-it is to be expected that the
foreign state will not honor or recognize the judgment. Other
countries may also decline to enforce these judgments, since comity
between nations does not require recognition of a judgment that is
considered void because of the terrorist state's public policy, sovereign
immunity, or in cases in which the only contact with the forum is the
276
killing of a U.S. national abroad and is thus deemed tenuous.
Of course, these plaintiffs are often faced with the difficulty of
locating these assets abroad from the outset. For these reasons, the
victims and their families pursuing civil actions in the war on
terrorism have most often sought to enforce their judgments, once
obtained, in U.S. courts by investigating and attaching assets tied to
the terrorist defendants-or through frozen assets as permitted by
Congress or the executive branch.
B. Executive Orders and Resistance
Obstacles have come at times from the executive branch, which
generally opposes litigation that crosses the country's borders because
of concern that such lawsuits and the enforcement of these
multimillion-dollar judgments undermine its control over foreign
policy and may hamper its fight against terrorism. "The current
litigation-based system of compensation is inequitable, unpredictable,
occasionally costly to the U.S. taxpayer and damaging to foreign
policy and national security goals of this country," William H. Taft IV,
the State Department's legal adviser, said in his testimony before the
Senate in July 2003.277 Over the years, the Administration has voiced
its opposition to the Alien Torts Claims Act of 1789, the Torture
Victims Protection Act of 1992, and the Flatow Amendment to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1996. Many legal scholars
believe the Administration's view is an overreaction, particularly
because U.S. courts hear countless international cases involving

276. See generally W. Michael Reisman & Monica Hakimi, 2001 Hugo Black

Lecture: Illusion and Reality in the Compensation of Victims of International
Terrorism, 54 ALA. L. REV. 561 (2003) (explaining that, because public international
law does not conform to the legislative and judicial practices in the United States and
does not provide for the standards of compensation applied in the U.S. courts,
taxpayers through the U.S. Treasury are likely to pay for the human rights violations
of state sponsors of terrorism); Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Note, Resolving Outstanding
Judgments Under the Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 496 (2002) (proposing that the best method for resolving the
outstanding judgments under the FSIA is to terminate them and resubmit the claims
to ad hoc international tribunals, because the punitive damage awards entered under
the terrorism exception make the prospect of a substantial taking claim more likely
and the tribunals will be created under conditions acceptable to the defendant states).
277.
Adam Liptak, U.S. Courts' Role in Foreign Feuds Comes Under Fire, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2003, at 1 (quoting William H. Taft IV).
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commercial disputes and should be able to adjudicate human rights
and other suits of concern to our courts; but separation of powers
278
concerns do remain.
At times this concern has taken the form of an amicus brief filed
by the Administration. In Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran,2 79 the
executive branch successfully opposed the use of the FSIA to
compensate victims in the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis, citing the
Algiers Accords signed in negotiating their release. Despite efforts by
Congress to surmount this objection through intervening (but vague)
legislation, the court was compelled to vacate its initial default
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Judge Sullivan lamented that
"[tjhere are two branches of government that are empowered to
abrogate and rescind the Algiers Accords, and the judiciary is not one
of them. ... [T]his Court has no choice but to grant the government's
'280

motions and dismiss the case.
The law in this area reflects awareness that sensitive foreign
policy judgments remain the exclusive domain of the executive
branch. Thus, the AEDPA gives the State Department the power to
decide which states may be sued. Likewise, our courts have
traditionally recognized that certain conduct by foreign states ought
not to be judicially cognizable because they are "acts of state." In a
similar fashion, legislative enactments and judicial precedent have
maintained that not only foreign states but also certain foreign
officials should be immune from suit for their official conduct. All
three branches of government should act together in supporting these
efforts against terrorism, recognizing that the war must proceed on
several fronts, civil as well as military and political. Despite the
underlying tension inherent in separation of powers issues, it is in
the best interests of all to keep this common goal in mind.

Id; see Molora Vadnais, Comment, The Terrorism Exception to the Foreign
278.
Sovereign Immunities Act: Forward Leaning Legislation or Just Bad Law?, 5 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 199 (2000) (evaluating the potential costs of terrorism and
offering modifications to the exception intended to minimize the effect of the exception
on U.S. interests while continuing to provide plaintiffs with a forum); Sean P. Vitrano,
Comment, Hell Bent on Awarding Recovery to Terrorism Victims: The Evolution and
Application of the Antiterrorism Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 213 (2000) (examining the controversy surrounding enforcement of
judgments under the antiterrorism amendments to the FSIA, including the position of
the executive branch and the effect of the government's intervention in litigation filed
under the antiterrorism amendments). See generally Jeewon Kim, Note and Comment,
Making State Sponsors of TerrorismPay: A Separationof Powers Discourse Under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 513 (2004) (arguing that in
shifting the burden of deciding sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the
judicial branch, Congress has exacerbated the struggle between the legislative,
executive, and the judicial branches, which leaves successful plaintiffs unable to collect,
deprives the executive of its foreign policy prerogatives, and encourages legislative
interference in judicial determination of pending litigation).
279.
Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D.D.C. 2002).
280.
Id. at 145-46.
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The executive branch has tremendous authority to seize and
retain assets of these organizations, as well as to release them in
certain circumstances. In addition to modifying jurisdiction through
the FSIA, provisions of the AEDPA set the procedure for the
Secretary of State's designation of foreign terrorist organizations,
proscribe providing such organizations with "material support," and
institute criminal penalties for violators.2 8 ' Moreover, the AEDPA
establishes civil penalties for banks and other financial institutions
28 2
that fail to freeze and report the assets of such organizations.
Similarly, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), in the case of "unusual and extraordinary" foreign threats
"to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United
States," authorizes the President, among other things, to
"regulate ...or prohibit . . .transactions involving, any property in
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest; by
any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States .... ,,"83 The statute allows the President wide
discretion in controlling international financial transactions,
including the transfer of monies, goods, and securities to and from the
United States. It allows the President to seize foreign assets held in
U.S. banks or foreign branches of U.S. banks. Courts have
consistently upheld these broad powers. 28 4 Presidents have used the
IEEPA to impose economic sanctions against particular countries in
response to political situations and, most recently, as a major weapon

281.
18 U.S.C. § 2339(b) (2003) (stating that violations are punishable by
imprisonment for not more than ten years, a fine of not more than $250,000, or both).
282.
18 U.S.C. § 2339B. Financial institutions that fail to report or comply with
a freeze order are subject to civil penalties of up to the greater of twice the amount
involved or $50,000. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. The proscriptions apply both in the United
States and to Americans and U.S. institutions overseas. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
283.
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701,
1702(a)(1) (2003). The controversy surrounding the broad powers granted to the
government under the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, and its expansion of the seizure of
assets provisions under IEEPA, will not be discussed here. See Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, as
amended (for complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title of 2001
Amendment note set out under section 1 of Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure,
and Tables). See generally SCHAFFER ET AL., supra note 209, at 263-66. This Article
instead addresses the merits of allowing the victims access to the funds already frozen
by the government.
284.
See, e.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (affirming the District Court's dismissal of a challenge by HLF to its
designation as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" pursuant to an Executive
Order issued under the IEEPA, accompanied by an order blocking all of the
organization's assets); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir.
2002) ("[Tlhe statute is designed to give the President means to control assets that
could be used by enemy aliens."); Consarc Corp. v. Iraqi Ministry, 27 F.3d 695, 701
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (providing that the Treasury "may choose and apply its own definition
of property interests, subject to deferential judicial review").
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in the war on terrorism by using the law to seize the assets of
terrorist groups and thereby cut off their funding.
In 1995, the President issued Executive Order 12947 pursuant to
the IEEPA. 285 That order designated certain terrorist organizations,
including Hamas, as "Specially Designated Terrorists," or SDTs, and
blocked all their property and interests in property. The order also
allowed for additional designations if an organization or person is
found to be "owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of," an
SDT. The President used this order to prohibit the contribution,
either in the United States or by U.S. citizens outside the country, of
funds, goods or services to or for Jihad, Hezbollah, the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and several other groups and
individuals. Violations are punishable by imprisonment of not more
28 6
than ten years.
In 2001, as part of his response to the 9/11 attacks, President
Bush issued Executive Order 13224, Blocking Property and
Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to
Commit, or Support Terrorism, pursuant to the IEEP. 28 7 Similar to
specified terrorist
Order 12947,
Order
13224
designated
organizations as "Specially Designated Global Terrorists," or SDGTs,
and blocked all their property and interests in property subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States. That order also allowed for
additional SDGTs to be designated if organizations or persons are
found to "act for or on behalf of' or are "owned or controlled by"
designated terrorists or if they "assist in, sponsor, or
provide ... support for" or are "otherwise associated" with them. 28 8
For example, on November 2, Hamas and twenty-one other foreign
terrorist organizations not related to al Qaeda were added to the
executive order. On December 4, 2001, pursuant to this order, the
Bush Administration froze the assets of the Holy Land Foundation
for Relief and Development, Beit A1-Mal Holdings, and A1-Aqsa
Islamic Bank. President Bush said all three are Hamas-controlled
organizations that finance terror. At that time, the United States had
designated 153 individuals, organizations, and financial supporters of
terrorism worldwide pursuant to Executive Order 13224. Before that
time, the United States had blocked more than $27 million in assets
of the Taliban and al Qaeda, and other nations have blocked at least

285. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 Executive Orders; Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg.
5079 (Jan. 23, 1995).
50 U.S.C. § 1705.
286.
287.
Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dotreas/terroristsanctions11070l.html
(discussing
Executive Order 13224 blocking Terrorist Property and summarizing the Terrorism
Sanctions Regulations, Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations, and
Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations).
288. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,079.

730

VANDERBIL TJOURNA L OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

[VOL. 38.'679

$33 million. The Department of State reports that 139 other nations
289
have blocking orders in force.
The designated terrorist states whose assets have been blocked
by the United States include Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea,
Sudan, and Syria; a recent report indicates that these assets now
total $3.1 billion. 290 In addition, since the 9/11 attacks, the United
States has frozen $112 million in terrorist-related assets worldwide,
with $34 million frozen in the United States. Of the $112 million,
$38.5 million is related to the Taliban, $44.5 million is related to al
Qaeda, and about $29 million is related to other terrorist groups. The
United States currently holds $1.1 million of al Qaeda assets in the
United States, which potentially can be used to compensate victims of
2 91
the 9/11 attacks.
Now that billions of dollars in assets have been blocked, the key
is to allow access to these assets when, as here, the circumstances
warrant it. Because frozen assets provide a powerful bargaining chip
for the executive branch-for example, through the government's
releasing of assets gradually to reward countries for behavior the
United States favors-one must recognize that allowing private
plaintiffs to enforce judgments by tapping into the frozen assets
located in the United States may weaken the executive branch's
negotiating position. On the other hand, doing so may send a strong,
unified message to countries that sponsor terrorism.
C. Collecting the Frozen Assets: The Victims of Trafficking and
Violence ProtectionAct of 2000 and the TerrorismRisk InsuranceAct
of 2002
The initial attempts of Flatow and others to collect their
judgments were unsuccessful.2 9 2 Two years after Flatow, the
presiding judge commented that

289.
Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Shutting Down Terrorist
Financial Networks (Dec. 4, 2001), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topicalpol
terror/01120409.htm; see also U.S. Targets Hamas Funding, ASsOCIATED PRESS, Aug.
22, 2003 (explaining that the Bush Administration froze the assets of six senior Hamas
leaders and five European-based organizations it says raise money for the radical
Palestinian group, in the first effort to block Hamas' assets or funding sources outside
the United States).
290.
For an itemized list of the amount of these assets, see David Ackerman,
Suits Against Terrorists (Jan. 25,
2002),
at app.
II, available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/8045.pdf.
291.
Press Release, Charles E. Schumer, Schumer: Give Victims of Terrorism
Access to Frozen Assets of Terrorist States (July 14, 2002), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-schumer/SchumerWebsite/pressroompressreleasesPRO1088.
html.
292.
See, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C.
1999); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999); Flatow v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 74 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. 1999) (refusing attempts by a
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to this date, the Flatow plaintiffs have been unable to collect on their
judgment, and the court views with considerable dismay the fact that
the rule of law is being frustrated in that case. Nevertheless, the court
cannot shrink from its duty to declare the applicable law in this case,
and must express its conviction that ultimately this judgment will not
be a mere Pyrrhic victory for the Eisenfeld and Duker families. Their
courage and steadfastness in pursuing this litigation, and their efforts
to do something to deter more tragic deaths and suffering of innocent
Americans at the hands of these terrorists, are to be commended and
293
admired.

1. The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000
Faced with enforcement problems, the inability to attach any of
the millions of dollars in Iranian assets still controlled by the U.S.
government, and the slim chance of finding attachable Iranian assets
elsewhere, the plaintiffs persuaded Congress to pass legislation
ordering the President to release frozen funds to satisfy some of these
judgments. On October 28, 2000, the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA) 294 was enacted, affording
certain victims of terrorists' acts an opportunity to recover funds from
the United States to satisfy their outstanding judgments. Clearly a
product of congressional compromise and presidential opposition, the
VTVPA only authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to pay portions
of eleven judgments that have been (or will be) handed down in suits
against Cuba or Iran under the FSIA exception § 1605(a)(7), since it
was enacted in 1996 with a cut-off date of July 27, 2000 (for the filing
of the suit).2 9 5 With respect to one judgment against Cuba, § 2002

private litigant to levy funds of Iran held in the United States under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act's state-sponsored terrorism exception); see also Alejandre v.
Republic of Cuba, 64 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (granting motion to quash writs of
garnishment obtained by U.S. families in position of judgment against the Republic of
Cuba on account of incidents of terrorism sponsored by Cuba which resulted in the
deaths of family members).
293.
Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2000).
294.
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act ("VTVPA"), Pub. L. No.
106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (codified as amended, in part, at 28 U.S.C. § 1610
(2002)).
295.
See cases cited supra Section II.B and notes 203, 212, 222 (citing Alejandre,

Flatow, Cicippio,Anderson, Eisenfeld, Higgins, Sutherland,and Jenco); see also Polhill
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15322 (D.D.C. 2001) (awarding a
judgment to widow against the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security, pursuant
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, for $300 million in compensatory and
punitive damages resulting from the thirty-nine-month captivity of her late husband in
Lebanon); Wagner v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 128 (D.D.C. 2001)
(holding that the court had subject matter jurisdiction because the evidence established
that Iran was designated a state sponsor of terrorism at the time the act occurred, and
the suicide bombing was a deliberate and premeditated act that qualified as an
extrajudicial killing for purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). All these
cases were brought against Iran, with the exception of the Alejandre case against
Cuba.
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provided that payment would be made from the assets of Cuba in the
United States that have been blocked since 1962. With respect to ten
judgments against Iran, Congress directed that payment be made
from appropriated funds (up to a specified ceiling) and that the
United States then be entitled to seek reimbursement for those
payments from Iran. Judgments in suits against terrorist states other
than those eleven have continued to be handed down by the courts,
but § 2002 provided no procedure for claimants other than the ones
identified to obtain satisfaction of their judgments.
The VTVPA directs the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury to pay,
upon request, a qualifying claimant 100 or 110 percent of
compensatory damages awarded by a court on claims filed under 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), plus post-judgment interest and any amounts
awarded by judicial order as sanctions against Cuba. The statute
gives the designated claimants three options, each with strings
attached. Claimants choosing the 100 percent option are entitled to
receive 100 percent of the compensatory damages awarded, plus postjudgment interest, on condition that they "relinquish all rights" to
compensatory damages and any right to satisfy their punitive
damages award out of the blocked assets of the terrorist state
(including diplomatic property), debts owed by the United States to
the terrorist state as the result of judgments by the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal, and any property that is at issue in claims against the
United States before that and other international tribunals (such as
Iran's Foreign Military Sales account). Claimants choosing the 110
percent option are entitled to receive 110 percent of the compensatory
damages awarded, plus post-judgment interest, on the condition that
they relinquish any further right to obtain compensatory and
punitive damages. Last, claimants may decline to obtain any
payments from the Treasury Department and then continue to
'296
pursue their judgments "as best they can.
An illustration of how the process works can be seen in the case
of Alisa Flatow's father. One month after the enactment of the
VTVPA, on November 28, 2000, Flatow applied for such funds,
electing 100 percent recovery of the amount of compensatory damages
His
post-judgment
interest, under
§ 2002(a)(1)(B).
plus
application was approved, and on January 4, 2001, the Treasury
Department transferred to Flatow more than $26 million of his $247
million award, representing the compensatory damages award and
post-judgment interest portion of the judgment. 29 7 Under this
provision, $96.7 million of the $193.5 million in Cuban assets frozen

296.

28 U.S.C. § 1610.

297.
For the procedures governing application for payment by the claimants in
the eleven designated cases, see Meeting Notice, 65 Fed. Reg. 70,382 (Nov. 22, 2000);
Notice, 65 Fed. Reg. 78,533 (Dec. 15, 2000).
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in this country has been paid in the one judgment against Cuba, to
the Alejandre plaintiffs, and more than $350 million has been, or will
be, paid in nine judgments against Iran; there is one more case not
298
yet decided (as of the date of this report to Congress).
In addition, Congress passed a measure in 1998 that called for
the State and Treasury Departments to assist victims of terrorism in
locating money for judgments. Section 2002 of the VTVPA modified
this earlier provision by changing the mandate that the State and
Treasury Departments "shall" assist those who have obtained
judgments against terrorist states in locating the assets of those
states to the more permissive "should make every effort" to assist
such judgment creditors. 299 Moreover, although the legislation allows
claimants to execute against certain assets, the President is given the
authority to stop the attachment of the frozen assets of a state "in the
interest of national security" and has done so. 30 0 Thus, the possibility
of obtaining additional assets to execute judgments faces an
uncertain future under this statute.
As was discussed above, the Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000 may have, in effect, given with one hand and
taken away with the other. When it was passed, the statute deleted
the exception language in § 1606, which had provided that a "foreign
state except for an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be
liable for punitive damages except any action under section 1605(a)(7)
or 1610(f)."30 1 The courts have interpreted this change to indicate
that punitive damages are no longer available under § 1605(a)(7)
against state sponsors of terrorism, but only against their agencies
30 2
and instrumentalities under the Flatow Amendment.
The VTVPA has engendered other complaints regarding the lack
of equity and fairness in the distribution of these assets. No
compensation has been paid in the nearly six thousand claims that
were determined to be legitimate by the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission in the late 1960s against Cuba for death, injury, and
expropriation during and after Castro's takeover. Some of these

298.
The information on the amounts paid was provided by the Office of Foreign
Assets Control and is current as of January 24, 2002. For a list of the judgments paid
from these funds for each case, see Ackerman, supra note 290, at app. II.
299.
Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 117, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A.
1610(f)(1)(A)). This section was added to the FSIA by § 117 of the Treasury and
General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999, as contained in the
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal
Year 1999.
300.
28 U.S.C. § 1610(0(3) (2002). Immediately after signing the legislation into
law, President Clinton exercised this waiver authority. Presidential Determination No.
2001-03, 65 Fed. Reg. 66,483 (Oct. 28, 2000).
301.
28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 2002(g), 114
Stat. 1464 (emphasis added).
302.
Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 105, 202 (D.D.C.
2003).
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claimants now criticize the use of a substantial portion of Cuba's
frozen assets to provide compensation for a single, later terrorist act.
In the case of the judgments against Iran, some have questioned the
use of U.S. funds to pay compensation. Also, both the Clinton and
Bush Administrations have raised objections to past efforts to use
diplomatic property and frozen assets to satisfy the judgments
30 3
against terrorist states.
2. The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002
The concerns over the partial and inequitable remedy of the
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act led to calls for
equal access for all U.S. victims of state-sponsored terrorism who
have secured judgments and awards in federal courts against state
sponsors of terrorism; 30 4 this was ultimately codified as the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA).30 5 The TRIA subjects the blocked
assets of a terrorist party and any agency or instrumentality of that
terrorist party to execution or attachment in order to satisfy 30 a6
judgment against them for any claim based on an act of terrorism.
Section 201(a) of the TRIA provides that a person who has obtained a
judgment against a foreign state designated as a state sponsor of
terrorism may seek to attach the blocked assets of that state in
satisfaction of an award of compensatory damages based on an act of
307
terrorism.
With the enactment of § 201, it is now easier for victims to collect
on judgments against Iran, a state that sponsors terrorism. 30 8 The
TRIA was designed to provide a new, powerful disincentive for any
foreign government to continue sponsoring terrorist attacks on U.S.
citizens. The TRIA removes barriers to the attachment of blocked

See Ackerman, supra note 290; see, e.g., Letter from Senator Charles E.
303.
Schumer to Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State (June 30, 2003), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-schumer/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/pressreleases/PR01824.
html (asking the Secretary of State to end courtroom opposition and let families of
early terror victims have access to Iranian assets to satisfy their judgments). But see
Sean K. Mangan, Compensation for "Certain"Victims of Terrorism Under Section 2002
of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence ProtectionAct of 2000: Individual Payments
at an Institutional Cost, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1037 (2002) (arguing that satisfaction of
terrorist exception judgments should remain subordinate to executive control of larger
foreign policy goals and that, by using court orders as a basis for attaching foreign
assets located in the United States, the provisions of 2002 and the terrorism exception
of FSIA unwisely pursue foreign policy goals through the federal courts).
304.
See, e.g., Schumer, supra note 291 (proposing bill to "provide equal access to
all U.S. victims of state sponsored terrorism who have secured judgments and awards
in Federal courts against state sponsors of terrorism").
305.
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 201,
116 Stat. 2322, 2337 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2002)).
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 201.
306.
307.
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 201.
308.
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14039 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
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assets by severely limiting the availability of the presidential waiver
to protect blocked assets. Before the TRIA, legislation permitted the
President to exercise a blanket waiver to protect blocked assets.
Under the new TRIA, a blanket waiver is no longer allowed, since the
President is now required to make "an asset-by-asset" determination
' 30 9
that "a waiver is necessary in the national security interest.
Moreover, the TRIA contains specific exceptions to the presidential
waiver authority. 3 10 A conference report on the bill explains that the
new Act "eliminates the effect of any [previous] presidential
waiver... making clear that all such judgments are enforceable"
311
against blocked assets.
In order for plaintiffs to be entitled to the execution or
attachment of the properties, they must first satisfy two
requirements set forth in § 201(a) of the TRIA: (1) the judgment for
compensatory damages that a plaintiff seeks to enforce must have
been obtained against a state sponsor of terrorism for actions arising
out of "an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage,
hostage taking[,] or the material support or resources for such an act
if such act or provision of material support is engaged in by an
official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within
the scope of his or her office, employment or agency" (for which a
terrorist party is not immune under § 1605(a)(7) of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 1602-1611) and (2) assets
subject to execution or attachment must have been actually
312
"blocked."
The courts have begun to execute judgments interpreting the
provisions of the TRIA. In Hegna v. Islamic Republic of Iran,3 13 $42
million in damages had been awarded to the family of a U.S. Agency
for International Development officer who was killed by Hezbollah
militants during the hijacking of a Kuwaiti Airlines flight in 1984. In
seeking to execute the judgment using the TRIA, the plaintiffs argued
that the condominiums at issue were "blocked assets" within the
meaning of the TRIA and had not been used "exclusively for
diplomatic purposes."3 14 The U.S. government in opposition argued

309.
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 201(b)(1).
310.
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 201(b)(2).
311.
148 CONG. REC. H8722-06, H8728 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2002) (conference
report submitted by Rep. Shays); see Hegna, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14039, at *19.
312.
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 201(a). See generally Jill M. Marks,
Annotation, Construction and Application of § 201 of Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of
2002, Public Law 107-297, § 201, 116 Stat. 2337, 190 A.L.R. FED. 155 (2004) (collecting
and analyzing the federal cases in which the courts construed or applied § 201 of the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 dealing with the treatment of terrorist assets
with respect to execution or attachment for the purpose of collecting on judgments
obtained against terrorist parties).
313.
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14039 (D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2003).
314.
Id. at *28.
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that the condominiums could not be attached because they were being
used exclusively for diplomatic purposes. 3 15 The court turned to the
definition of "blocked asset" in the TRIA:
(A) any asset seized or frozen by the United States under section 5(b) of
the Trading With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 5(b)) or under sections
202 and 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1701; 1702); and
(B) does not include property that (i) is subject to a license issued by the United States Government for
final payment, transfer, or disposition by or to a person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States in connection with a transaction for
which the issuance of such license has been specifically required by
statute other than the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) or the United Nations Participation Act of 1945
(22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.); or
(ii) in the case of property subject to the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
or that enjoys equivalent privileges and immunities under the law of
the United States, is being used exclusively for diplomatic or consular
purposes.316

After examining the legislative history of the Act, the court found
that the condominiums in question were blocked assets because they
were not used exclusively for diplomatic purposes. 3 17 Accordingly, the
magistrate judge recommended that the U.S. government's motion to
quash writs of attachment be denied and that the plaintiffs' motion
for a turnover order be granted; the judge held that the properties
were not immune from attachment under the Terrorism Risk
318
Insurance Act.
In Ungar, the court found that the Holy Land Foundation for
Relief and Development (HLF) is an agency and instrumentality of
Hamas because it acts "for or on behalf of' Hamas as Hamas' fundraising agent in the United States. 3 19 Therefore, the HLF's blocked
assets were subject to attachment and execution under the TRIA in
order to satisfy the present judgment against Hamas. 320 The court,
however, identified a problem of dwindling assets:
[T]hese blocked assets are steadily depleting because the Treasury
Department has allowed the HLF to use the assets to pay its attorneys
to challenge the blocking order and defend the HLF against a civil
action arising from its collection of funds for Hamas. Any delay in
entering a final judgment against Hamas will allow further depletion of
these assets and reduce the amount of money available to satisfy this

315. Id.
316.
Id. at *30-31.
317. Id at *35.
Id at *36-37.
318.
Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 304 F. Supp. 2d
319.
232, 241 (D.R.I. 2004).
320. Id. at 241.
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Court's judgment. Given Presidents Clinton and Bush's designations of
Hamas as a terrorist organization, it is unlikely that Hamas will bring
any new assets into the United States. Therefore, the blocked assets of
the HLF and Hamas may be Plaintiffs' sole source of money to satisfy
this Court's judgment. When the HLF and/or Hamas fully deplete these
assets, this Court's judgment against Hamas will likely become a dead
letter. Such a result would defeat Congress' clear intent that 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333 deter terrorist acts through the enforcement of civil causes of
action such as the one presently before the Court.
Simply put, time is of the essence. Any delay in entering a final
judgment against Hamas may make Plaintiffs unable to collect the
compensation due to them and cause Plaintiffs to suffer further
injustices at the hands of Hamas. 321

Therefore, the court determined that there was no just reason for
delay and that plaintiffs' motion to enter a final judgment against
3 22
Hamas should be granted.
The ability to attach the assets in question under the TRIA often
hinges on the nature of the assets themselves. Several cases have
held that the plaintiffs are not entitled to assets when the assets are
the property of the United States. In Smith v. FRB,3 23 the Second
Circuit held that the plaintiffs, 9/11 representatives proceeding under
the TRIA to attach seized Iraqi assets in satisfaction of a judgment,
were precluded from doing so because the President had previously
confiscated the blocked assets and vested title in them in the U.S.
Department of the Treasury. Since, pursuant to an executive order,
the assets had become assets of the United States, they were not
subject to attachment under the TRIA.3 24 Similarly, the court in
Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran3 2 5 held that the TRIA did not
provide an express waiver of federal sovereign immunity. Thus, the
accounts that were the property of the United States could not be
attached by the family to satisfy its judgment against Iran. In a
subsequent case, three Iranian banks' assets in U.S. bank accounts
could not be attached under TRIA; the Iranian banks operated under
3 26
a general license and the accounts were not seized or frozen.
Likewise, the plaintiffs seeking compensation through the TRIA
have had their efforts complicated by the war in Iraq. On March 20,
2003, on the eve of war, the President issued an executive order that
released about $300 million in funds due in judgments awarded
against Iraq, while simultaneously confiscating all remaining Iraqi
assets frozen in the United States and designating them for the

321.
Id. at 241-42 (citations omitted).
322.
Id.
323.
280 F. Supp. 2d 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
324.
See also Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 47-48 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(adopting the reasoning of the Second Circuit's decision in Smith).
325.
274 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2003).
326.
Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 299 F. Supp. 2d 63 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
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reconstruction of Iraq. 327 By taking title to those funds, the President
effectively transferred all remaining frozen Iraqi assets in the United
States into the coffers of the U.S. Treasury, emptying the bank
accounts against which other U.S. plaintiffs with cases against Iraq
had hoped to collect. So while a few plaintiffs-those with postjudgment writs of attachment to specific Iraqi assets in the United
States-received payment, those who had not yet gotten to that late
stage in their lawsuits against Iraq suddenly were deprived of the
source of funds from which they had hoped to extract
328
compensation.
Meanwhile, Stephen Flatow's quest to collect the punitive
damages awarded in his 1998 case continues. 329 As his lawyer,
Steven Perles, explained, "That is the portion of the judgment
intended to deter Iran's future conduct. '330 Through investigating
and levying suits against instrumentalities and their assets in the
United States with connections to the terrorist defendants, Flatow
hopes to punish the terrorist groups responsible for his daughter's
tragic death. In Flatow's latest effort to attach the funds from a sale
of a bank in California that had been nationalized by the Iranian
government, a federal judge rejected Flatow's attempt to collect the
money because he had not proved that Iran had day-to-day control
over the bank. 331 The U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the
case.

33 2

IV. CONCLUSION

Recognizing that the struggle to collect on these judgments
continues, support of this civil action approach is the crucial, though
only the first, step. As one court recently noted, "The only way to
imperil the flow of money and discourage the financing of terrorist
acts is to impose liability on those who knowingly and intentionally
333
supply the funds to the persons who commit the violent acts."

Exec. Order No. 13,290, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,307 (Mar. 20, 2003).
327.
328.
Uriel Heilman, Fightingfor their Due, JERUSALEM POST, June 13, 2003.
See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 U.S. App. D.C. 275 (D.C. Cir.
329.
2002) (dismissing appellant's contention that he was entitled to post-judgment interest
on his punitive damages award for lack of jurisdiction).
330.
Laurence Arnold, Father of Terror Victim Seeks Court Ruling to Help His
Lawsuit, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 26, 2003, available at http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.
com2003/LAW/02/26/suing.terrorists.ap/.
331.
Flatow, 353 U.S. App. D.C. 275.
332.
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 538 U.S. 944 (2003); see also Flatow v. Alavi Foundation, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17753 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that a not-for-profit foundation in New York was
not an instrumentality of a foreign government, and thus was not subject to a writ of
execution to satisfy plaintiffs judgment against the foreign government).
333.
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1021 (7th Cir. 2002).
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Congress' enactment of the terrorist-related statutes discussed above
indicates legislative intent for accountability and provides victims of
terrorism with a forum for that accountability. The testimony
supporting this legislation placed much emphasis on the deterrent
effect that these statutes would have on the commission of acts of
international terrorism against U.S. citizens. Such legislation would
"interrupt, or at least imperil, the flow of terrorism's lifeblood,
money."33 4 While acknowledging that the execution of civil judgments
may be difficult, experts testified that this approach would contribute
to the antiterrorism struggle by deterring terrorists from choosing
U.S. targets and by "drying up terrorism's financial support in the
United States. ' 33 5 In addition to accountability and compensation,
several of these statutes can be used to punish and deter future acts
336
of terrorism.
Numerous federal statutory and common-law tools are available
to litigants in the civil battle against terrorism: the Antiterrorism Act
of 1991, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(with its amendment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act), the
Torture Victim Protection Act, the Alien Tort Claim Act, and
common-law tort claims, including negligent and intentional infliction
of emotional distress, battery, assault, aiding and abetting,
conspiracy, wrongful death, survival, false imprisonment, and others.
The aggregate model proposed here is a judicious approach that uses
a combination of all available causes of action, each of which will
apply with varying effectiveness against particular defendants or
classes of defendants, depending on the facts. By aggregating these
claims, victims and their families can target terrorist groups, officials
and other individuals, along with the foreign states, organizations,
and agencies who sponsor them. As has been shown, particularly in
cases with multiple defendants, the ATA and AEDPA can
complement each other both in the availability of a cause of action
and damages. This can be achieved by employing ATA § 2333 for nonsovereign defendants and FSIA § 1605(a)(7) for sovereign state
sponsors of terrorism, and in particular the Flatow Amendment

334.
Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 304 F. Supp. 2d
232, 239 (D.R.I. 2004) (citing Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Hearing on S2465 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts. and Admin. Practiceof the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong.
85 (1990) (statement of Joseph A. Morris, President and General Counsel for the
Lincoln Legal Foundation in Chicago)).
335.
Id.
336.
This is the central argument currently being raised by the plaintiffs in the
Burnett I case, Third Amended Complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia on November 22, 2002. See Burnett I, 274 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C.
2003) (dismissing some of the common-law tort claims against one of the organizations
but upholding the complaint as stating a cause of action on plaintiffs' federal statutory
claims).
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against agents and instrumentalities of a foreign state.33 7 In addition,
these statutes present jurisdictional variations, such as individuals in
their official versus personal capacity, and state versus organization.
The more expansive view of personal jurisdiction over individual
defendants in the AEDPA cases may be relied upon more favorably
than the restrictive traditional approach of some courts under the
ATA. 3 38 Thus, the potential flaws of one claim may be circumvented
by another.
Moreover, some courts have held that FSIA § 1605(a)(7) is
merely a jurisdictional tool requiring the invocation of other causes of
action to maintain an independent claim against the foreign state,
and that the Flatow Amendment only provides a private right of
339
action against officials, employees, and agents of that state.
Depending on the underlying facts of the case, the TVPA or commonlaw claims could be the ideal supplement.3 40 Not to be overlooked is
the potential for "aider and abettor" liability against defendants in
3 41
their personal capacities.
Finally, one can aggregate the damages available under each. As
noted above, the degree to which punitive damages are available as a
remedy under each cause of action differs with the nature of the
defendants. While the courts have emphasized that the availability of
treble damages under the ATA precludes an award of punitive
damages, 342 they have found punitive damages to be available under
the AEDPA and common-law intentional torts. 343 Note, however, that
several cases recently brought under the AEDPA have not allowed
punitive damages against a foreign state, but only against agencies
and instrumentalities of that state and individuals in their personal
capacities under the Flatow Amendment.3 4 4 In sum, one judge
explained:

See, e.g., Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 226
337.
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
338.
Compare Pugh v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 290 F. Supp.
2d 54, 59 (D.D.C. 2003) (adopting a more expansive view of personal jurisdiction in
claims brought under the AEDPA), with Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov't Auth.,
310 F. Supp. 2d 172, 178 (D.D.C. 2004) (restricting personal jurisdiction of the courts to
the traditional "minimum contacts" test for claims brought under the ATA).
See, e.g., Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, 1033
339.
(D.C. Cir. 2004).
340.
See, e.g., Regier v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 87, 100 (D.D.C.
2003).
341.
Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Burnett I, 274 F.
Supp. 2d at 104-05.
342.
Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 240.
343.
See Kilburn v. Republic of Iran, 277 F. Supp. 2d 24, 42-43 (D.D.C. 2003)
(addressing this issue and supporting the availability of punitive damages); see also
Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 278-79 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
344.
See, e.g., Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 105
(D.D.C. 2003).
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[Although punitive damages are allowed under the Flatow
Amendment, punitive damages are not available against Iraq because
28 U.S.C. § 1606 immunizes foreign states from liability for punitive
damages. Furthermore, the Flatow Amendment does not apply to the al
Qaeda defendants. The plaintiffs' claims against the al Qaeda
defendants are brought under § 2333 of the ATA, which provides for
treble damages and attorneys fees but does not provide for punitive
damages. To the extent that § 2333's treble-damages provision already
provides a penalty, this Court is foreclosed from assessing additional
345
punitive damages against the al Qaeda defendants.

Despite possible interference with the foreign policy efforts of the
executive branch and potential difficulties in its enforcement, an
award of punitive damages does communicate a strong message. As
asserted by the court in Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the
purpose of punitive damages
is to punish wrongful conduct-to prevent its repetition by the offender
The victim to
and to deter others who might choose to emulate it ....
whom the award is made thus stands as a surrogate for civilized society
in general; the victim is made more than whole in order that others
346
may be spared similar injury."

The enforceability of these judgments has significant
implications for the business community as well. If a civil suit in U.S.
courts by U.S victims of overseas terrorism is recognized by foreign
courts and the judgment is implemented against terrorist groups,
then it stands to reason that lawsuits arising from common business
transactions between multinationals would also be enforceable. In
reducing wrongs to civil monetary damages that carry weight beyond
national boundaries, some common ground is reached in recognizing
the legitimacy of courts in the international sphere, thereby providing
greater stability for business transactions in a global economy.
Most important, the war on terrorism might be waged more
effectively if the assets of these groups were attached and levied upon
wherever they are found, with the support of the international
community through comity and the rule of law. In the absence of that
option, as an alternative or supplement, the government should allow
and support access to the frozen assets of terrorist states and
organizations that are already present in the United States, and it
should help plaintiffs to identify and seize additional assets. The
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 currently provides the means
with which to do so. Use of this powerful tool can deplete these assets
before they can be exploited by the terrorists, which would thus help
to achieve the dual goals of reparation to the victims and the

345.
Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 239-40 (citing Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 113 n.17 (D.D.C. 2000)).
Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107, 114 (D.D.C. 2000)
346.
(citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)).

742

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 38:679

dismantling of the terrorist infrastructure. Each individual plaintiff
must now do the rest.

